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MARKET INTERMEDIATION, PUBLICNESS, AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson
ABSTRACT
Securities class actions play a crucial, if contested, role in the policing of securities fraud
and the protection of securities markets. The theoretical understanding of these private
enforcement claims needs to evolve to encompass the broader set of goals that underlie the
securities regulatory impulse and the publicness of those goals. Further, a clear grasp of the
modern securities class action also requires an updated understanding of how the role of market
intermediation in securities transactions has reshaped the realities of securities litigation in public
companies and the evolution of the fraud cause of action in the context of open-market
transactions. The Supreme Court’s embrace of market efficiency as a mechanism to establish
reliance in its 1988 decision, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, illustrates the necessary adaptation of
common law fraud to the modern market setting, and Congressional enactment of the PSLRA in
1995 exemplifies the efforts to respond to the litigation risks inherent in that adaptation.
Together, Basic and the PSLRA provide a frame for understanding both a series of recent
Supreme Court decisions on securities class actions and a different understanding of the theory
undergirding those class actions. To develop this understanding, we expand the conversation
about the goals of securities regulation to include the set of goals that are rooted in publicness
and focus on market protection, innovation, and growth, as well as stability and systemic
considerations. We posit that this broader theoretical understanding explains why the Court
rejected a challenge to the fraud on the market doctrine and, instead, permitted the continued use
of market efficiency: the Court chose to preserve the deterrence and enforcement role of these
cases in promoting market growth and innovation. We then apply this understanding of
publicness and market intermediation to the interpretation of the Court’s limited, but ambiguous,
use of “price impact” in securities fraud cases. Our analysis reveals that the practical balance
established by Basic and the PSLRA has prevailed over pure doctrinal approaches to issues like
reliance or other, more incomplete theoretical explanations focused solely on compensation,
deterrence, and investor protection, but neglecting the role of publicness in the securities
markets.
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INTRODUCTION
The legitimacy and efficacy of Rule 10b-5 and the use of class actions to enforce it have
been debated at great length.1 The initial judicial focus on the implication of a private right of
action gave way to contests over the meaning of the elements of common law fraud and other
prerequisites necessary to prove the cause of action.2 The seesaw pattern of the cases in the first
half century of federal securities laws were enough to give a reader whiplash.3 Later
Congressional and judicial action, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(the PSLRA), inserted procedural hurdles to contain litigation agency costs and provided
openings to vigorous contests over which elements of fraud are ripe for decision at early points
in the litigation cycle.4 Over time, the fact of the 10b-5 cause of action has become more clear
and permanent, but the interpretation of it has become more opaque and procedurally focused.5 A
series of post-2010 Supreme Court cases focused on how much of the 10b-5 cause of action is
fair game at the class certification phase of the litigation.6 In doing so, they illustrate the turn to
procedure and the complexity and confusion that have come with it, while reaffirming the
Court’s commitment to the securities class action as an enforcement and deterrence mechanism.
But it was not just the law that changed; there were fundamental changes in the role of
markets in securities transactions. The expanding role of market intermediation in securities
transactions is important to understanding the evolution of the common law tort of deceit into
today’s, fraud-on-the-market based 10b-5 class action, as well as to the specific issue of price
impact. First, as the Supreme Court said in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the market is an unpaid agent
of the investors in modern securities transactions.7 By adopting the fraud-on-the-market
1

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security).

2

A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV.
841, 849 (2009).
3

An initial long stretch of expansive holdings by the Supreme Court gave way to a seemingly
unbroken run of restrictive opinions. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court
and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L. J. 1571 (2004)
(showing expansive decisions from the late 1930s through the early 1970s and then twenty-four restrictive
decisions and one expansive in the 1970s and 1980s after Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the court).
See also, A. C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities
Laws, 52 DUKE L. J. 841 (2003) (tracing the change from expansive to restrictive decisions to the
influence of Justice Lewis Powell, appearing upon his arrival and disappearing with his retirement).
4

See the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.

5

John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
1 (2015).
6

Those cases pushed two fraud elements—materiality and loss causation—out of the class certification
phase and reaffirmed the Court’s pathbreaking Basic Inc. v. Levinson decision, published a quarter
century earlier that embraced theories of market efficiency as the basis for a presumption of the reliance
element of fraud. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
7

Basic, 485 at 244 (citing one of the early fraud-on-the-market cases, In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D.
134, 143 (N.D.Tex. 1980)). That opinion, written by Patrick Higginbotham, later a judge on the 5th
Circuit, also discussed the market’s role as a transmission belt for information. Id.
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presumption, it recognized that the necessary connection between defendants’ misrepresentations
and plaintiffs’ loss can be shown when, in an efficient market, the fraud is incorporated into the
market price of a security and, thereby, impacts the investors’ decision to buy or sell stock.8 In
doing so, the Court acknowledged the role of the market as an impersonal intermediator in the
transmission of information in today’s securities transactions. Second, modern financial learning,
including for example about diversification and portfolio theory, tells us that most shareholders
own only a small percentage in any particular company and, thus, have little reason to be active
investors, including, for example, suing when there is fraud.9 The class action mechanism brings
efficiencies to this setting and, as the Court has recognized, is practically the only way private
actions are likely to be brought, providing deterrence and enforcement of securities regulations.
These legal developments and the new market realities have combined to poke holes in
traditional theories for private enforcement. Diversified investors, particularly those following
more passive investment strategies of relying on the market, may seem just as likely to be hurt by
private fraud suits (as their portfolio companies pay the costs of the litigation) as to benefit on
the receiving end of those suits. Further, the law of the 10b-5 claim has lost any coherent
connection to the traditional tort-based compensation rationale, and more generally, the case law
has made a hash of the 10b-5 jurisprudence.10
This article develops a better theoretical understanding of these issues. In Part I we focus
on the Rule 10b-5 cause of action and its foundation in common law fraud. The 10b-5 claim is
ripe for confusion. Its fraud base means there are as many as eight elements the plaintiff must
separately prove to prevail and an equal number of places where the defendant can mount an
attack.11 A judicial tendency to conflate the elements and their proof—for example, materiality
with reliance or reliance with loss causation—exacerbates the mess.12 Further, the interaction of
two key temporal dimensions of the 10b-5 claim adds to the complexity:
(1) The front end and back end of litigation (i.e. matters to be addressed at pretrial motions versus those left to trial). Congress has chosen to move judicial
review forward for some, but not all, of the elements that make up a Rule 10b-5
claim so that parties have ample incentive to characterize their claims to fit the
procedural setting most favorable to their case.
(2) The front end and back end of a fraud. The nature of fraud is that there
seemingly is a temporal division between when defendant’s misrepresentation and
plaintiff’s reliance on it occur and when plaintiff’s injury is ordinarily realized
8

Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47.

9

See infra note 37 and accompanying text.

10

See infra Part IV below.

11

See infra Part I below for a discussion of the common law elements of fraud.

12

See e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1212 (2013) (Thomas J.,
dissenting) (arguing the Amgen majority conflated the doctrinally independent elements of materiality and
reliance); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007)
(conflating loss causation with reliance).
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and measureable. This line turns out to be less real in a class action context, but
has been subject to recurring battles in the class certification setting.13
As to the first, defendants’ natural inclination is to push issues forward to the earlier stages of
litigation, where procedure reigns over substance.14 In three cases before the Supreme Court
since 2011, defendants sought to require the plaintiffs to prove three of the substantive elements
of the 10b-5 cause of action—materiality, reliance, and loss causation—as a condition to class
certification.15 The defense bar has pressed the Court to accept that elements that might
otherwise be subject to proof only at trial, should be proved earlier in the litigation and, thereby,
prevent a trial. The defendants came up short in each case, but those cases shifted the judicial
focus to yet another issue: price impact. Defendants are now using the price-impact element to
contest reliance during the class certification phase. We explore that debate later in the article, by
examining its place in the larger theoretical debate about securities class actions.16 We also
13

Jill Fisch has very effectively addressed the temporal confusion between ex ante price distortion and
ex post price impact in Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 899, 921, 924 (2013). Don Langevoort likewise has pointed to the conflation of
reliance and loss causation. Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud on the Market: Reflections
on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37 (2015).
14

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), permits defendants to bring a motion
to dismiss as to scienter and misrepresentation prior to any discovery, increasing opportunities for
defendants to take advantage of the procedural settings at the front end of litigation. Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 747. One study showed almost 40% of
cases are dismissed at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland & Matthew
Goforth., When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How Much?—An
Update 1, 3, (PLUS Journal, April 2013; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 445;
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No, 145),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260831 (study of all securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010
showed “38% of cases ended relatively quickly and painlessly for the defendants”). Yet, cases that do
survive the motion to dismiss have higher settlement value, thus increasing the pressure on defendants to
settle the case or, alternatively, increasing their incentive to find another way to eliminate the case
procedurally prior to discovery or trial. Id.
15

Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (loss causation);
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (materiality); Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (reliance).
16

Price impact is not yet well understood, and the confusion is due, at least in part, to the confusion
surrounding the second temporal dimension—the difference between the front and back end of fraud. In
short, the defendants’ misrepresentation and plaintiffs’ reliance on it would typically occur at Time 1, or
at the beginning of the class period, but the plaintiffs’ injury is typically realized and usually measured
with regard to facts available later, at, for example, Time 2, after the fraud is revealed. It is, in fact,
endemic to fraud that investors do not know about it at the front end. As the Supreme Court pointed out in
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, at the time of the purchase or sale, the investor has not yet sustained an
economic loss that would give rise to recovery, nor can damages be effectively measured. Dura Pharms.,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-43 (2005).
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discuss another key element of the class action, reliance, which is very different in open-market,
anonymous transactions than in traditional face-to-face encounters.17
In Part II, we explore the arguments and tensions surrounding the use of the class action
to pursue open-market transaction claims and how the securities version of fraud has necessarily
developed differently from its common law cousin. In Part III, we trace the key recent Supreme
Court decisions that have produced the emerging jurisprudence on class actions more generally
and on price impact in particular. These cases, when read together, reveal how the focus on the
“science” of market efficiency, combined with a ratcheting up in procedural battles, has created
layers of litigation that are both muddled and problematic. The result is a diminished and
impoverished understanding of the substance of fraud, which harms both investors and corporate
decision makers, who often have to make reporting decisions in rapid fashion.
Part IV turns to the theoretical understanding of securities class actions more generally,
expanding the discussion from investor-based justifications to a view of the class action as part
of the larger securities regulatory impulse. To do so, we expand the discussion of the goals of
securities regulation to include those that are focused on creating strong, healthy markets that
enable capital allocation, growth, and innovation. These goals, along with those focused on
systemic risk and stability, are a part of the securities regulatory structure that has its home in
publicness, the space outside of the private focus on transactions between sellers and purchasers
that takes in the broader effect on citizens at large. Publicness in the more general sense reflects
what society demands of powerful institutions, in terms of transparency, accountability, and
openness, in order for that power to be legitimate.18 The specific application here encompasses
the idea that over time, the motivations for securities regulation have expanded well beyond
individual investors and their relationship to the financial markets to include the impact of those
17

Two traditional elements of common law fraud—reliance and loss causation—correspond to these
two time periods. Reliance (transaction causation or but for causation) focuses on the connection between
the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s wrongful conduct at Time 1. There cannot be a cause of action,
even for a misrepresentation that is material and made with the requisite mental state, if there is not a
sufficient connection to the plaintiff’s harm. A traditional phrasing would sound something like this, “I
heard your misrepresentation and in response changed my conduct.” List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (asking whether “plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he
did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact”). In contrast, loss causation describes
the connection at the back end, after the fraud is revealed. A plaintiff, who has relied on the defendant’s
wrongful conduct, cannot recover unless the loss is properly attributed to the fraud. This loss-causation
link addresses the fact that in open-market securities-fraud cases, the question has been how to sort out
the change in value properly attributed to the fraud from the changes due to other, often constant, market
price changes.
We and others have discussed the term “publicness.” See Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy
of Corporate Publicness, Pomerantz Lecture, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014); Donald C. Langevoort &
Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO.
L.J. 337 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012 (2013); Hillary A.
Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2011); see also Joan M.
Heminway & Shelden R. Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933,
78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011).
18
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markets on society and citizens more broadly.19 Congress and the Supreme Court recognize class
actions as an accepted part of American securities regulation, and we argue that publicness and
the market and citizen focused goals of securities regulation support that recognition. As a result,
we argue, securities fraud class actions are necessarily different from traditional common law
fraud and will have correspondingly different risks of, for example, overcompensation.20
In this Part, we identify a third temporal dimension that is important to our argument—
the front end and back end of the regulation of securities. The front end is the familiar disclosure
regime that is the recurring focus of American securities regulation and the back end is the
antifraud enforcement that Rule 10b-5 provides. Market efficiency and intermediation play a role
in both facilitating securities offerings and enabling the class action that helps support the
deterrence and enforcement necessary to create strong and healthy markets. This is the space in
which securities regulation and market intermediation meet publicness and where the scope of
the traditional theory of class actions necessarily expands. Interestingly, however, the result is
that the space for arguing about reliance then contracts. We illustrate this result by applying this
publicness-based theory to the price-impact, class-certification context. We conclude that the
resulting contraction reflects both the role of market intermediation in securities litigation that is
consistent with its role in the front end of securities regulation, as well as the importance of
securities fraud enforcement to the broader, publicness goals of market protection, innovation,
growth, and stability and systemic risk.
I. THE COMMON LAW FOUNDATION OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10B-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission have been the source of considerable academic
commentary over the years. Although at one point there was a fight about whether the courts
could “disimply” the private cause of action that had been implied by courts, Congressional
action in 1995 retained it, adding procedural hurdles to cabin its use in contexts seen as
19

We develop publicness in this article both in the context of market efficiency as well as the deterrence
effect of class actions. What we used to view as a form of “private” regulation is in fact increasingly
public in nature. Publicness impacts regulatory decisions as well as those of corporate actors who, as a
result of publicness, are subject to heightened accountability. The impact of corporate decisions on the
markets resulting, for example, in the 2009 financial crisis, increases pressure on legislatures, regulators,
and others to address, through the regulatory structure, the potential for further market shocks and
recessions. In addition, in the context of securities litigation, publicness means that choices by corporate
actors about what and how they communicate do not stop at the corporate door.
20

Both Congress and the Court have addressed this risk, for example, by permitting rebuttal to the
presumption of reliance in Basic and by developing multiple requirements for securities fraud class
actions through the PSLRA. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
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worrisome.21 Nevertheless, the 10b-5 cause of action and the cost of litigating it remain
controversial.22
Rule 10b-5 claims have multiple elements, almost all with roots in the common law. In
the end, if a case goes to trial (and very few do), the Supreme Court has provided the following
list of elements that the plaintiffs must prove:
1. a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant(s);
2. scienter;
3. a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase
or sale of a security;
4. reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission;
5. economic loss; and
6. loss causation.23
The Supreme Court’s list, not surprisingly, reflects the long-standing elements of
common law fraud; the black letter elements of the tort of deceit are basically the same. Private
recovery for deceit can occur if there is:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

a defendant’s misrepresentation of
a material
fact
done with scienter
on which plaintiff relies
suffering damages as a consequence.24

Indeed the Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the securities statutes explicitly draw on
common law, sometimes phrasing it as expanding on common law fraud and other times
adapting the common law fraud.25

21

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.

22

Fisch, supra note 13.

23

This list originates in Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo in 2005, and in a somewhat shortened form
appears in Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. in 2008, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano in 2011, Halliburton I in 2011, Amgen in 2013, and Halliburton II in 2014. See e.g., Dura
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005); Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, (2011); Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011); Amgen Inc. v. Conn.
Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John, Fund, Inc.
(Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418 n.1 (2014).
24

WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 685-86 (4th Ed. 1971) at 685. This source does not break out
materiality in a separate heading, but discusses it within misrepresentation. Id. at 695.
Compare Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 341 (“resembles, but is not identical” to the common law) with
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating “an important purpose of the
federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections
by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry.”) See also Basic, 485 U.S. at 244
25
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Rule 10b-5’s language, as promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in
1942, included the first three specific elements from common law fraud—misrepresentation of a
material fact.26 The elements of scienter, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation were
omitted—not surprising for a rule originally adopted in an afternoon to empower the government
to go after fraudsters.27 When courts later decided that the same policy and rule would permit
private causes of action, it was also not a surprise that they looked to common law fraud to fill
out the requirements of scienter, reliance, and loss causation.28 Plaintiffs must prove all of the
elements to recover.
The Court’s list of the elements, which comes from a 2005 Supreme Court opinion, Dura
Pharmaceuticals, has contributed to the confusion around these claims.29 For example, it
combines two—materiality and misrepresentation—that common law and prior Supreme Court
opinions have recognized as separate.30 There are many material facts that shareholders would
want to know, but unless the corporation or a person associated with it has an obligation to
disclose information, the failure to do so is not a misrepresentation (by omission) and, therefore,
no 10b-5 claim arises.31 The list also omits entirely the requirement that the material
misrepresentation be as to a fact (as opposed to an opinion), a context that generated the Court’s
most recent securities opinion.32 Further, the Court drops into the middle of its list of common
n.22 (1988) (Rule 10b-5 actions are “in part designed to add to the protections provided investors by the
common law”).
Section 11 of the 1933 Act is framed against this same template of the elements of common law
fraud, but it relaxes the requirements for reliance, changes the burden of proof for loss causation, and does
both for scienter. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act adopts a different combination of
these same elements, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) and Section 18 of the 1934 Act provides yet a different
combination that includes a double reliance requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 78r.
26

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

27

Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967).

28

See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (E.D. Pa. 1946).

Dura’s addition of economic loss to the list has also been criticized as not following from commonlaw deceit precedents. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort, 66
VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1768, 1773 (2013) (damage understood as a prudential filter by which judges have
excluded certain well-founded but trivial deceit claims; this requirement “dissipates (or, perhaps,
disappears)” when plaintiff only seeks relief based on rescission or unjust enrichment; because courts
have understood damages as a pragmatic filter, they have not insisted on the exacting conception of
economic loss invoked by Dura).
29

30

See Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17 (distinguishing materiality—addressed in that case—from duty to
disclose, an element of misrepresentation).
Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We do not have a system of
continuous disclosure. Instead firms are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news)
unless positive law creates a duty to disclose.”).
31

32

Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1321-22 (2015)
(distinguishing opinion from facts that can be misleading in the context of a section 11 (not Rule 10b-5),
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law fraud elements the requirement that the misrepresentation be in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security.33 These words, drawn from similar language in the Securities Act, reflect
the New Deal desire to provide a federal claim for common law fraud cases occurring in
securities markets for which state law had proven inadequate.34
As our first step in clarifying the 10b-5 cause of action and aspects of its proof, then, we
suggest that the Court’s framework in Dura causes unnecessary confusion. Rather than
continuing to rely on the Dura list, we propose a reframing of the elements organized around:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the defendants’ prohibited conduct;
the plaintiffs’ harm;
the connection between the conduct and the harm; and
the link to a securities transaction.

The two elements that make up the requisite “connection” are core to this article, and both are
sometimes denoted as causation. The reliance element provides a front-end link between the
plaintiffs’ purchase or sale and the defendants’ prohibited conduct (Time 1). Reliance is
sometimes referred to as transaction, or but-for, causation. Loss causation, however, refers to a
different connection usually measured at the back-end and sorts out losses that can be attributed
to the fraud from those that can be allocated to another source (Time 2). This element addresses
the concern that market prices can move in response to factors other than the alleged
misstatement or omission. For example, the market price of an individual security can fall in
response to an overall decline in the market. Loss causation responds to the legal and policy
concerns that the plaintiffs should not be insured against market changes.35 This element plays
the intervening or proximate cause role that the Palsgraf case plays in traditional tort cases.36
Yet, in securities fraud cases, the change in market price normally shows up after the fraud has
been revealed; thus, loss causation seeks to disaggregate the loss, or to separate out the portion
due to the fraud. Reliance and loss causation are, therefore, different from each other and,
because of market intermediation, different in an open-market securities setting from that of the
traditional common law fraud claim.

but finding that statement of opinion qualifies as misleading statement if opinion expressed was not
sincerely believed).
33

Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 341.

34

See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22 § 12, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).

35

See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
151, 181-84 (2009) (discussing the Dura Court’s analysis of loss causation); See also Jill E. Fisch, Cause
for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811 (2009) (discussing the Dura
Court’s analysis of loss causation).
36

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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Table 1: Elements of Common Law Fraud in 10b-5
Common Law Elements
Relating to Defendant’s
Conduct

Common Law
Elements Relating to
Plaintiff

Common Law Elements Defining
Connection Between Defendants’
Wrongful Act & Plaintiffs’ Loss

Necessary
Connection to
Securities

1. Misrepresentation
(includes a. affirmative lies; b.
half-truths; or c. silence if there
is a duty to speak)

5. Plaintiff suffers harm
(economic loss)

6. Reliance (by plaintiff on
defendant’s wrongful act,
sometimes discussed as “transaction
causation” or “but for” or “causation
in fact”)

8. In connection with
the purchase or sale of
a security

1.

2. of a material

2.

3. fact

3.

4. done with scienter (a
sufficiently bad mental state)

7. Loss causation (sometimes
discussed as proximate cause, and
distinguishing loss from the fraud
from loss from other sources such as
the market)

II. SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS
Securities fraud cases are different from the traditional common law fraud case. Modern
securities transactions often occur in public markets, not in face-to-face transactions. The
common characteristics of markets and transactions mean that individual suits for fraud arising
in this setting make little economic sense. Thus, securities fraud cases usually occur as class
actions, creating a different litigation context and the need for a different understanding of some
of the elements, including, for example, reliance and damages.37
A.

Class Actions as a Response to the Economics of Individual Shareholders

Securities fraud litigation occurs largely in the class action context, and the cases support
an industry for both plaintiff and defense side lawyers.38 The class action mechanism addresses
two key issues for open-market securities fraud claims arising in modern public corporations.
The first is that the costs of litigating an individual securities fraud claim exceed the holdings of
most individual investors39 Portfolio theory and investment patterns reveal that shares are
dispersed among numerous shareholders each owning a small percentage of a company’s stock.
37

See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).

See Lynn A. Baker et al., Setting Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions: An Empirical
Assessment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1677 (2013).
38

39

See id. at 1679.
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Indeed, most investors do not hold a significant number of shares in any given company.40 As a
result, the cost of hiring a lawyer to pursue a fraud claim will likely quickly surpass the value of
the typical individual stake in a public company so that it is not worth an individual’s while to
pay the costs of litigating a claim. In economic terms, these small investors have a collective
action problem. Their losses are too small to support litigation unless they join as a group or
class.
B.

Class Actions and Litigation Agency Costs

In addition to low incentives to sue due to the size of their claims, investors also have low
incentives to monitor the class action litigation that may be brought on their behalf.41 As a result,
the plaintiffs’ lawyers play a very significant role in these cases. They do the cases on
contingency and manage the litigation—in consultation with representative plaintiffs. Because of
the contingency aspect, the lawyers also assume the risk of any loss, including the cost of cases
that do not result in settlement.42 When these cases do settle, there are often substantial fees to
the lawyers and, when spread across the class, relatively small recoveries for individual
plaintiffs. Opponents argue that many of these cases amount to little more than strike suits.43 The
litigation is frequently described as vexatious.44 Others have argued that the plaintiffs’ bar brings
cases simply to extract unwarranted settlements and that the cases can harm the reputation of the
defendants, resulting, in the view of the opponents, in high opportunity and transaction costs
from the litigation.45 Some claims are difficult to sort out46 and, whether the fraud occurred or
not, litigation takes time away from executives running the business.
Proponents of private class actions, however, argue that the cases are key to deterrence
and, therefore, enforcement of the securities regulations and that they support the scarce
resources of the Securities and Exchange Commission.47 In this view, plaintiffs’ lawyers act as
private attorneys general, enforcing the fraud prohibitions and, thereby, promoting the goals of
fair and efficient markets that, as we explore in Part IV, are tied to publicness, innovation,
growth and stability. This private attorneys general view is particularly important when
40

Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 536 n.21
(1997).
41

Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1747 (2004) (discussing litigation agency costs).
42

See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 40 at 554.

43

Brief for Petitioner at 42-43, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No.
13-317).
44

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).

45

Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. &
ECON. 365, 375-78 (2006).
46

Id. at 742 (noting that oral claims in securities cases can be hard to sort out).

William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L.
REV., 2129-50 (2004).
47
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considered in light of the relatively small holdings of the average plaintiff and the resulting lack
of incentive for a small investor to bring the cases on his or her own.48
C.

The Role of Insurance

The power of the litigation is increased by the fact that, for the defendants, the
consequences of litigating and losing are very high. Defendants found liable for fraud lose their
directors and officers insurance coverage and their indemnification.49 Further, the damages,
which would be personal at that point, are potentially very large.50 This looming shadow of
liability [at the back end] arguably adds to the [front-end] value of the claim and increases its
strike and settlement value. For those reasons and many others, including the mixed incentives of
both the defense and plaintiff-side lawyers, these cases rarely go to trial. Instead, they are
resolved by settlement, after litigation focused on motions and procedural arguments, and with
little attention to actual facts or evidence.51 Insurance policies cover the settlement costs,
including fees for plaintiffs’ counsel, as well as paying the defense lawyer fees along the way.
Thus, insurance policies, with their exclusions for fraud and bad faith, play a role in the incentive
to settle and the amount of money available for settlement.
D.

Causation and Impersonal Market Transactions

The common law of fraud requires each injured person to have relied on the misstatement
or omission in order to prove her claim.52 Yet, in publicly held corporations the interactions
supporting these fraud claims are trades in impersonal markets and thus are unlike the traditional
relationship-based fraud of the common law fraud setting. The market acts as an intermediary.
Further, class action rules that cover the typical securities litigation require that class member
claims be sufficiently similar, addressed with a standard that focuses on whether questions of law
48

For a summary of the debates on these issues and a discussion of research on the topic, see Fisch,
supra note 40.
49

They also suffer reputational harm, though that harm may well be more perceived than actual. See
Helland, supra note 45.
See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund
Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 372 (2015) (discussing the average recovery and aggregate damages
in securities class actions). See also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985).
50

51

See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 896 (1992) (noting that the potential for “substantial
overcompensation” influences the parties’ “bargaining dynamics associated with pre-trial settlement.”);
Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 497 (1991).
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (“To
recover damages for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff must prove . . . ‘reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission’. . . .”) (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds,
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013)).
52
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or fact common to class members predominate over questions affecting individual members.53
Combining the impersonal nature of the transaction with the class action, then, results in the need
for adjusting the common law, and in particular, the reliance element.
Consider the following example. If all investors were Warren Buffett, they would be able
to prove their reliance on a defendant’s misstatement or omission, because they would read the
company’s offering documents, quarterly, or annual reports. Those investors would be well
informed and up to date on the company’s changes in management, product lines, and
strategies—at least those that were made public.54
Investors, however, trade for multiple reasons and with varying degrees of information.
Indeed, unlike Warren Buffett, small investors are less likely to read all or any of a company’s
filings.55 Their reliance is not directly on company documents or statements, but is, instead,
indirectly on those filings as interpreted by analysts or brokers and others who translate the
information to the market.56 As a result, an insistence on maintaining reliance as developed at
common law would defeat the use of the class action and eliminate the enforcement it brings. It
is for this reason that, in 1988, the Supreme Court recognized the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in
the now famous case of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.57 In Basic, the Court defined the requisite
connection between a defendant’s wrongful act and plaintiffs’ harm, noted that there is more
than one way to demonstrate that connection, and decided that the 10b-5 version of fraud must
account for the difference between modern securities markets transactions and their common
law, face-to-face counterparts. Applying these principles, the Court held that as long as the
securities trade in an efficient market, all investors—both Warren Buffett and the small
investor—can be presumed to have relied on the market price as a reflection of the value of a
share.58 This is where market intermediation comes into play. In short, the theory is that if the
market is efficient, a term about which there is considerable debate, public information about the
company will be impounded into the stock price. Thus, when an investor or that investor’s
retirement fund buys the securities at the market price, the price reflects the information – true or
false. The presumption is that public, material misrepresentations can distort the price of stock
traded in an efficient market, and, as a result, purchasers in that market may be considered to
53

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).

54

Of course, if all investors were like Warren Buffet, they would have relatively large holdings in
companies, making it worth their while to sue.
55

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
569 (1984).
56

Id.

Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-45 (1988) (“[O]ur understanding of Rule 10b-5’s reliance
requirement must encompass [the differences between “modern securities markets, literally involving
millions of shares changing hands daily” and “face-to-face transactions contemplated by early fraud
cases] . . . . Requiring plaintiffs to show a speculative state of facts . . .would place an unnecessarily
unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.”).
57

58

Id. at 249-50.
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have done so in reliance on the misrepresentation. To be sure, this form of reliance is only a
presumption and is subject to rebuttal.59
This theory of market efficiency, or market intermediation, acts as a proxy, so to speak,
for reliance as traditionally required for face-to-face transactions. It was controversial when
adopted in Basic, and has been debated ever since – both in the legal60 and the economic
literature.61 Nevertheless, it provided the commonality necessary for class actions and, as we will
explore in Part III, prompted a trio of recent Supreme Court cases, one of which affirmed both
the presumption and its importance.
A second element affected by the open-market setting is the calculation of damages. The
usual method has been to use an event study, that measures the change in the price at the time of
correction of the fraud, or Time 2, as a proxy for how much inflation occurred at the time of the
misstatement, or Time 1.62 This delta is generally referred to as the price impact of the fraud, and
much of what we know about its measure has occurred in the context of damage and loss
causation measurement.
In theory, the value of the fraud could be measureable at the front end—at the time
defendant makes the misrepresentation and plaintiffs enter into the securities transaction. The
goal would be to measure the out-of-pocket harm to the security holder, or the difference
between the value the stock was represented to have and its actual value at the time of the
transaction. But, that turns out to be somewhat difficult to measure. The price at the time of
transactions is available, but if it incorporates the fraud, it does not reflect the security’s true
value. Economists, therefore, have focused on data that is more cacheable as a proxy for that
value, using information from the back end.63 They look at how much the price changed
(dropped) when the fraud was revealed and use that as a measure for the value of the
59

Id. at 248-49 (giving three examples of when the presumption might be rebutted: (1) market makers
are already privy to the information conveyed by the defendant; (2) if credible countervailing information
enters the market and dissipates the effect of the fraud; (3) as to plaintiffs who would have sold without
relying on the integrity of the market (i.e. if motivated by concerns unrelated to the fraud.) This
combination of rationales applicable to all investors and only to one investor creates some conceptual
problems that have plagued later efforts to coherently describe the theoretical basis for the presumption
and its rebuttal. See infra text accompanying notes 149-169.
60

See generally Fisch, supra note 13; Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed
in Securities Class Actions? 63 BUS. LAW. 25 (2007).
61

See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach
to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002); Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on
the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 457 (2006).
62

See Merritt B. Fox, Halliburton II: It All Depends on what Defendants Need to Show to Establish
Price Impact, 70 BUS. LAW. 437 (2015) (discussing event studies in securities litigation generally and in
price impact contexts more specifically).
63

Dunbar & Heller, supra note 61, at 508.
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misrepresentation. 64 The event study methodology aids in separating the price change
attributable to the fraud from any other source, including particularly from the usual changes that
occur in public markets.65 This work is that of the loss causation element, which necessarily
operates off of data at the Time 2 point to make a conclusion about damages for the Time 1
fraud. Here is where the conflation between the two elements has occurred.66 As discussed
below, it is hard to reconcile price impact in the context of reliance, or Time 1, with this Time 2
approach.
E.

PSLRA Provisions to Regulate Class Actions

The arguments surrounding the costs and benefits of securities class actions formed the
basis of a strong push for reform of the litigation of these claims, culminating in the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).67 The PSLRA contained a myriad of reforms
to securities claims and litigation, most of which have played out procedurally and two of which
provide the foundation for the most recent series of 10b-5 cases before the Supreme Court.68
As noted above, scienter, or the defendants’ state of mind, is an element of a securities
fraud claim. Prior to the PSLRA, several courts had used Rule 9(b) of the FRCP to require that
Rule 10b-5 claims be subjected to heightened pleading requirements.69 As to scienter, the
PSLRA requires that plaintiffs plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.70 This inquiry, of course, is very fact-based.
As a result, although the standard is “uniform,” the outcomes will never be. Fights about this
64

See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F. 2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J. concurring)
(reasoning that out of pocket measure, but not rescission, could be the basis for class certification;
describing how data between date of misrepresentation and date of corrective disclosure can be arranged
on a “price line” and “value line” to measure the effect of defendant’s wrong conduct at the time of the
misrepresentation and the times afterwards).
65

See Fisch, supra note 13; see Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud
Damages with Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11, 12-13 (2009) (“The iconic status of the event
study is due to what it replaced: expert opinion based on unsupported assertions about materiality and loss
causation, and as inflation-per-share estimates drawn from little more than junk science.”); Langevoort,
supra note 35, at 180 n.127 (“To some extent at least, doubts about efficiency also call into question the
precision of the event study itself, which often makes efficiency-driven assumptions in drawing the
baseline against which observed returns are measured.”).
66

See Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, The Supreme Court and Causation Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 37-38 (2005).
67

See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, n.57 (2000) and H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 104–369, at. 31–32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing the benefits and potential for abuse in securities
class actions).
68

See Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John, Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2426 (2014).
69

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007).

70

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (b)(2) (2006 ed. & Supp. V). While providing a heightened pleading standard, the
statute did not identify the required state of mind, leaving that to be determined by the courts.
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standard, and how courts should implement it, were the first wave of procedural litigation under
the PSLRA.71
The PSLRA also added a provision that stays discovery pending the outcome of a motion
to dismiss.72 This provision works in tandem with the heightened pleading standard for scienter
(and also for the misrepresentation element) to push plaintiffs to develop facts prior to filing their
complaints in order to survive the motion to dismiss and pursue their claims.73 With respect to
the strike suit/vexatious litigation argument summarized above in Part II-B, these provisions also
worked to decrease the settlement value of a complaint early in the litigation and gave
defendants the opportunity to end potentially frivolous cases without having to sustain the costs
of discovery.74 At the same time, a complaint that survives the motion to dismiss is one that has
met a very stringent pleading standard and has done so without access to documents or other
discovery. For these cases, the settlement price tag likely has increased. Defendants could choose
to settle those cases and move on, and in the early days, some did just that.75 Increasingly,
however, defendants have been deploying additional procedural litigation tactics at other pre-trial
stages of the case.76 The goal here, like in employment and consumer fraud cases, is to prevent
the case from going to trial through the use of the class-certification process.

71

See Adam C. Pritchard and Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to
Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125 (2005).
72

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006 ed. & Supp. V).

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) (stating that in order “to
curb . . . perceived abuses” in class actions, Congress “authorize[ed] a stay of discovery pending
resolution of any motion to dismiss.”); see also SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of
Cal., 189 F.3d 909, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The ‘Stay of Discovery’ provision of the Act clearly
contemplates that discovery should be permitted in securities class actions only after the court has
sustained the legal sufficiency of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); Pension Trust Fund for Operating
Eng’r v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 913, 914 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (“The purpose of this
stay is to allow the Court to evaluate plaintiffs' claims in security actions before the defendant is required
to engage in extensive and expensive discovery.”); Avenue Capital Mgmt. II, LP v. Schaden, No. 14-CV02031-PAB-KLM, 2015 WL 758521, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 20, 2015) (“The legislative history of the
PSLRA indicates that Congress enacted the discovery stay to prevent plaintiffs from filing securities class
actions with the intent of using the discovery process to force a coercive settlement.”) (citations omitted);
In re Diamond Foods, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C 11-05386 WHA, 2012 WL 6000923, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
30, 2012) (“[T]he consolidated complaint has sufficiently pled scienter and loss causation under the
PSLRA . . . [t]he discovery stay is now lifted . . . .”).
73

74

Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA's
Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH U. L.Q. 537, 576-78 (1998).
75

Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes during the
First Decade after the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1498-99 (2006).
76

See Jonathan Dickey, Securities Litigation: A Practitioner's Guide (2006-2014) (a practical guide,
including many procedural tactics, for defending securities class action suits).
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F.

Class Certification Procedures in Securities Class Actions

To understand the growth in the procedural issues raised by the defense bar, it is
necessary to review the typical litigation path for these cases. After the initial step of filing a
complaint, the litigation of one of these cases begins with a motion to dismiss, subject to the
heightened pleading standard. The plaintiffs’ lawyers must meet the defendants’ motion to
dismiss with very strong facts to support their case. Additionally, as mentioned above, they must
do so without the aid of discovery.
After the motion to dismiss, the parties can settle or they can move on to discovery and
trial. Increasingly, these cases face a second stage of procedural battles focused on class
certification. Defendants have sought to bring a larger number of issues into the class
certification stage, in an attempt to defeat certification, and, thereby, the case. In addition, during
the class certification battle, the defendants have argued that discovery should be limited solely
to issues related to class certification.77
At this stage, the focus, given FRCP 23(b)(3), is whether common or individual issues
predominate.78 The challenge has been to determine whether a particular fraud element of the
claim is one that is key to predominance or whether, if not proved at trial, would result in the
case failing for all plaintiffs alike. The defendants have fought aggressively at this stage arguing
that the plaintiffs need to prove, not plead, materiality, reliance, and loss causation at class
certification and before trial. In addition, defendants have argued that reliance as presumed by
Basic should be proved, and not presumed, at class certification.79
The Court has rejected almost all of these claims by defendants, but it has done so in
ways that have prompted additional fights. Both Halliburton opinions are examples of the
procedural nature of much of current litigation. The Halliburton defendants have now made two
trips to the Supreme Court to argue about the various levels of proof required on two different
elements of these claims.80 Both arguments involve the class certification stage, and the second
round of litigation was prompted by the Court’s language in the first opinion.81 As a result, the
77

Brief for Petitioner at 3, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014) (No. 13-317).
78

Before Halliburton I, discovery began after the motion to dismiss, limited to class certification. While
Halliburton II was pending, cases began to move into general discovery.
79

See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 35-37, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (No. 13-317); Halliburton II,
134 S. Ct. at 2412.
80

See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (considering
whether plaintiffs relying on the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish reliance were separately required
to establish loss causation in order to obtain class certification); Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398
(considering whether defendants could rebut the Basic presumption with evidence of a lack of price
impact at the class certification stage).
See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2187 (“Because we conclude the Court of Appeals erred by requiring
EPJ Fund to prove loss causation at the certification stage, we need not, and do not, address any other
question about Basic, its presumption, or how and when it may be rebutted.”).
81
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case, which was filed in 2001, has not yet been tried or “proved,” and presumably, defense
counsel have billed thousands of hours in litigation.82
G.

Class Actions and Theories about Securities Regulation

Class actions have not only led to significant changes in the elements of the fraud but also
have disrupted the traditional tort-based theories used to support Rule 10b-5 claims. In particular,
class actions challenge the compensatory rationale often given for tort claims like securities
fraud. In the usual securities fraud class action setting, shareholders who were deceived, and
therefore paid too much or too little, sue to recover their loss from the deceiver. A compensatory
theory easily supports such a claim in a 1933 Act setting where the wrongdoer (the issuer and
those working with it) are on the other side of the transaction from the investor and gain what the
investor lost. In the typical setting under the 1934 Act, however, the wrongdoer is the company
or its management and usually neither buys nor sells shares as a counterparty to the investor.
Rather, the company/insiders made the misleading statement, and the investor thereafter traded
with a third party, who is not a defendant and gets to keep any gain.
Tort law, of course, is amenable to making those who deceive pay for the harm even if
they did not directly benefit, but in the corporate setting, the result is that the corporate treasury
will pay directly or indirectly by indemnifying directors and officers or paying the insurance that
funds the settlement. Thus, circularity arises as funds go from one shareholder pocket (or one set
of shareholders) to another shareholder pocket (or a somewhat different set of shareholders) after
a substantial amount has been subtracted for attorneys’ fees and other transaction costs.
Consequently, the compensation justification for recovery loses much of its force.
The other traditional justification for fraud recovery, deterrence, fares better than
compensation, but triggers additional complications in the class action context. Although the
individuals who make misleading corporate statements can be held personally liable, such that
damages would likely be expected to deter their conduct, the reality is that payments from the
company or its insurer diminish this direct form of deterrence/enforcement. Instead, the
enforcement/deterrence justification is much more indirect—if companies pay it will make their
officers and boards change their behavior, increase investor belief in the markets, and support the
publicness goals of securities regulation. We return to these issues when we engage in the
theoretical discussion of securities class actions, market intermediation, and publicness in Part
IV.
III. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SUPREME COURT SECURITIES JURISPRUDENCE: MATERIALITY,
RELIANCE, LOSS CAUSATION AND PRICE IMPACT
Four twenty-first century Supreme Court opinions are responsible for the current
confusion over the use of price impact in proof of reliance and loss causation, and they share
82

The district court granted class certification for one corrective disclosure and denied class status for
five others in July 2015, referring to the “long and winding history of the matter.” See Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02−CV−1152−M, 2015 WL 4522863 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015).

17

HILLARY A. SALE & ROBERT B. THOMPSON
several common features.83 First, they illustrate narrow holdings that, like common law cases
generally, decide only the immediate case, putting off the larger issue for another day. Each issue
and case unfolds from, and is connected to, the prior case, such that one needs to read them
together to understand the Court’s current approach to 10b-5 and price impact. Further, the
narrow holdings—and the Court’s loose language as to questions such as price impact—gave
defendants (who lost the cases) room to continue to litigate, including bringing the same case,
Halliburton, back to the Court.
Second, these cases illustrate the current focus of 10b-5 litigation on the class
certification context. The Court has trimmed the scope of class certification arguments, holding
that materiality and loss causation questions are not appropriate and that the presumption of
reliance does apply. In the wake of those holdings attention has shifted to another dimension
arising at class certification, the narrowly defined space for price impact left open by Halliburton
II. Third, the cases reaffirm the foundation of Basic that class actions are a core part of securities
regulation and, importantly, Basic’s conclusion that adaptations to the common law of reliance
through market intermediation and the fraud-on-the-market presumption are necessary if class
actions are to have the effective deterrence role the Court supports.
A.

The Four Cases

Before delving into the four 10b-5 cases, a reminder about the front and back end of the
claims is useful. As we noted earlier, common law fraud requires a sufficient connection between
a defendant’s wrongful act and a plaintiff’s loss. The defendant’s misrepresentation occurs at
Time 1, and the plaintiff’s injury typically is realized at Time 2, when the fraud is revealed. The
focus of reliance is at Time 1, the time of the transaction: did the plaintiff change his or her
position in response to the misrepresentation? In contrast, the focus of loss causation, given the
reality of how proof of damages occurs in modern securities markets, is usually later, at Time 2,
when the truth is revealed. Demonstrating loss causation requires parsing the loss into the portion
that can be attributed to the fraud and the portion allocated to other causes. In securities markets,
where prices change regularly, that question is constant and complicated. The recent Supreme
Court cases illustrate different aspects of the relationship of these two factors.
1.

Dura Pharmaceuticals: Pleading Front End (Time 1) Facts Does Not Meet the
Standard for Pleading Loss at the Back End (Time 2).

We begin with Dura Pharmaceuticals,84 a case decided a few years before the three class
certification cases, and one that turned on the two distinct temporal dimensions inherent in fraud
cases: Time 1, when the misrepresentation and reliance occur, and Time 2, when the truth is
revealed and the effect of the fraud is actually felt. In Dura, the Supreme Court addressed the
economic loss and loss causation elements in the context of a motion to dismiss.85 Put
succinctly, the issue in the case was loss at Time 2, and plaintiff’s complaint addressed facts only
83

See generally Fisch, supra note 13.

84

Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).

85

Id. at 336, 346.
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for Time 1. The plaintiff pleaded price inflation due to the fraud.86 Necessarily, in any successful
fraud case price distortion occurs.87 That is what fraud does. There is not, however, always an
injury, and a plaintiff must also show harm (loss) that can be attributed to the fraud as opposed to
another cause. Harm and loss, however, are visible only later, at Time 2.
For contextual purposes, the allegations in Dura were that the defendants had made
misstatements about earnings and about expected FDA approval of an asthmatic spray device
that was not approved.88 There was evidence of loss causation for the earnings claim, but that
claim failed the scienter-pleading standard at the motion to dismiss, leaving only the FDA
claim.89 Without getting into the facts of Dura in detail, the price movement of the stock was less
than ideal for the plaintiffs’ purposes.90 With respect to the loss causation element, the plaintiffs
alleged the following: “[i]n reliance on the integrity of the market, [the plaintiffs] . . . paid
artificially inflated prices for Dura securities” and the plaintiffs suffered “damage[s] thereby.”91
The defendants argued that this allegation was insufficient for the loss causation element,
which requires a causal connection between the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations and the
plaintiffs’ economic losses.92 After noting that the standard to be applied to the pleading of this
element was that of FRCP 8(a)(2), a “short and plain statement” of the facts, the Court held that
the complaint did not meet the test.93 Instead, the Court held that the plaintiffs needed to claim a
connection between the misstatement or omission and their injury.94 In doing so, the Court
pointed out that by definition, if the defendants are committing fraud, the harm does not occur at
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 at 73, In re Dura Pharms, Inc. Sec. Litig. No. 399-CV-00151-L(WMC), 2006 WL 3267513 (S.D.
Cal. 2006).
86

87

Usually this would be inflation of value, but sometimes, as in Basic, the effect can be to lower the
value of the stock, harming investors who sell at a deflated price. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
227-29 (1988).
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 at 32 and at 17-18, In re Dura Pharms, Inc. Sec. Litig. No. 99-CV-0151-L(WMC), 2006 WL
3267513 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
88

89

Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 340 (describing the trial court’s dismissal of the drug-profitability claim
because plaintiff had not adequately pleaded scienter).
90

There was a noticeable drop after disclosure of new earnings and ambiguous results after disclosures
about the FDA action—but the lower court had disposed of the earnings claims on scienter grounds.
91

Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336, 339-40.

Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Consolidated and Amended Complaint at 20, In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig. No., 1999
WL 33998677, at *1.
92

93

Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336, 346.

94

Id. at 346-47.
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the point at which the plaintiffs buy the stock.95 At that point, Time 1, although the market price
is presumably inflated or sustained by the fraud, the harm has not yet occurred. It occurs later, at
Time 2, when the fraud is revealed, and the shares lose their value. Thus, the plaintiffs needed to
provide information about where the loss and harm occurred, subject to the Rule 8 “short and
plain statement” pleading standard.
In reaching the holding, the Court set out the two bookend concerns characteristic of its
current approach to Rule 10b-5: the importance of the cause of action in “maintain[ing] public
confidence in the marketplace . . . by deterring fraud, in part through the availability of private
securities fraud actions”96 and the potential for vexatious litigation in the modern class action
setting.97 The Court focused on two settings in which plaintiffs would be able to show inflation
at Time 1 but should not be entitled to a recovery.98 The first is if there is a misrepresentation
about the securities, which, for example, inflates their price above their true worth, but plaintiff
sells while the misrepresentation remains alive in the market and is not harmed. Here, there
would be misrepresentation, but no loss (yet). Second, the Court identified the context in which
there is misrepresentation and loss to the plaintiff, but the loss can be said to arise from a source
other than the fraud.
The first is a familiar problem addressed, for example, in the language of Section 11 of
the 1933 Act.99 The second is the traditional space for loss-causation both in common law fraud
and in securities market cases.100 The Court’s holding is straightforward and noncontroversial,
illustrating the difference in the front and back end of 10b-5 cases and the procedural context that
frames current litigation.101 In the end, the Court’s holding had a limited effect. On remand, with
95

Id. at 342.

96

Id. at 345 citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986).

97

Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347-8. Here the Court echoes Blue Chip Stamps and the dissenters in
Basic. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988) (White, J. dissenting). See Sale, supra note 74, at 552-68 (discussing Congress’s reform
movement to curb vexatious litigation). See generally Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities
Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes during the First Decade After the PLSRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489
(2006) (same).
98

Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336, 342.

99

See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(2) (2012) (permitting recovery by any person acquiring a security for which a
registration statement contains an untrue statement of material fact, but recovery limited to difference
between the amount paid and the price at which the price received in the market before suit if the price
remains inflated at the time of the sale, that purchaser will have suffered no economic loss). See
generally, Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities
Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2000).
100

Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 343. See generally supra note 32 and accompanying text.

But see the Court’s inclusion of a quotation from Justice White’s dissent in Basic using a “Cf.” signal
to suggest an analogous example of investor insurance if allowing recovery in the face of affirmative
evidence of nonreliance that blurs the lines between reliance and loss causation somewhat. Dura Pharms.,
544 U.S. at 345.
101
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the pleading on the loss-causation element adjusted from Time 1 to Time 2, the complaint
survived a motion to dismiss.102
2.

Halliburton I: Proof of Loss Causation Is Not Required to Show Reliance at
Time 1 or for Class Certification

Next in the line of evolution is Halliburton I,103 a case that also revolved around loss
causation. Here, the focus had shifted from pleading loss causation, which turned out to be quite
easy in light of Dura, to whether the plaintiffs had to prove loss causation at the class
certification stage.104 Defeating a case at class certification is a win for defendants, because the
matter will presumably disappear. Moreover, at that point, the insurance policy is still paying the
defense lawyers’ fees, and a trial on the merits, with the concomitant discovery and spectacle of
officers and directors on the stand, goes away.
This case came to the Supreme Court from the 5th Circuit, which had earlier held that in
order to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance at class certification the plaintiff
had to prove (not just plead) loss causation.105 The Supreme Court rejected this argument.
Reflecting the learning of Dura about the role of the loss causation element as distinct from
transaction causation/reliance, the Court held that loss causation’s focus on Time 2 has “no
logical connection” to the facts necessary to establish the Basic presumption of reliance at Time
1, when an investor decides to buy securities. Reliance and loss causation are separate elements
and together mean, for example, that even if investors relied on a defendant’s misrepresentation
at Time 1 to buy securities when the price was distorted by fraud, they cannot recover absent loss
causation at Time 2. The Court was also clear that only the first question is relevant at class
certification.106
Halliburton I also reaffirmed the core learnings of Basic. First, reliance connects
misrepresentations to injury. 107 Second, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate reliance in the same
manner as in a traditional face-to-face fraud action would be impossible and would create an
unnecessary and unrealistic evidentiary burden for open-market claims.108 Indeed, the
requirement would block class actions. And, third, fraud on the market resolves the reliance
102

In re Dura Pharms., Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (S.D. Cal. 2006). See also the subsequent litigation at
548 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
103

Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).

104

Brief for Petitioner at 2, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014) (No. 13-317).
105

Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F. 3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (loss
causation required to be proved for class certification).
106

Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2186. This part of the opinion is simple enough and may reflect why the
opinion was a unanimous, five page opinion with only one unnumbered footnote.
107

Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2184.

108

Id. at 2185.
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concern and, in doing so, provides a path for recovery for fraud that helps to ensure public trust
in the markets.109 The Court also reaffirmed Basic’s holding as to what the plaintiffs must show
to gain the presumption of reliance. Here, the Court noted that plaintiffs have to demonstrate that
the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known, that the market was efficient, and that the
purchase or sale of stock occurred between the misrepresentations and the truth.110
The Court refused, however, to take up the defendants’ efforts to characterize the opinion
below as not about loss causation, but really about the conditions for gaining the presumption of
reliance. Halliburton argued that the Court should require the plaintiffs to establish whether the
alleged misrepresentations affected the market price in the first place, or whether the
misrepresentations had a “price impact” on Halliburton’s stock.111 The Court rejected this
characterization of the opinion below, as well as the conflation of the elements, and refused to
reach for this issue, leaving the difficulty of proving reliance, or the lack there of, in the openmarket setting, for what turned out to be Halliburton II.112
3.

Amgen: Materiality Need Not Be Proved at Class Certification Before Basic Is
Invoked

In between Halliburton I and Halliburton II, defendants argued that plaintiffs must prove
materiality at the class-certification stage in order to invoke the fraud-on-the-market
presumption.113 The Court was no more open to this argument than the loss-causation one. This
opinion, however, is substantially longer and more complex. It also generated three dissents and
left space for additional litigation of the issues the Court did not decide.
Materiality, like loss causation, is one of the elements of Rule 10b-5 fraud imported from
the common law. Notably, neither of these elements is among the ones that Congress, in the
PSLRA, decided to subject to the motion to dismiss and discovery stay. In addition, materiality,
unlike loss causation, is specifically mentioned in Basic as one of the prerequisites the plaintiff
must show to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance (discussed in more detail
in the next part). Defendants argued that because materiality was a predicate for the presumption
of reliance, and without that presumption individual claims would dominate over common ones,
plaintiffs should have to prove materiality at class certification.

109

Id.

110

Id. Note that this listing of the preconditions leaves out materiality, an omission the Court in Amgen
later reinserts without discussion. The list itself comes from footnote 27 of Basic where that court seems
to be simply citing from the Court of Appeals opinion below. It is a very humble beginning for what turns
out to be the determining issue of Halliburton II. See infra Part III B
111

See Fisch, supra note 13.
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Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John, Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2398 (2014).

113

Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
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The Supreme Court held that although proof of materiality is required at trial or to prevail
on the merits, it is not a prerequisite to class certification.114 The Court’s opinion is strongly
rooted in procedure and more particularly in Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that common issues
predominate to gain class certification.115 The Court first pointed out that Rule 23(b)(3) requires
only a showing that the questions common to the class predominate, not that they are answered
on the merits for the class.116 Then, the Court noted that materiality is an objective standard: it is
a question common to all class members.117 Thus, if the plaintiffs were unable to prove
materiality, they would fail to do so for all class members, not for individuals, and therefore,
individual issues would not predominate on the question of materiality.118 Specifically, the
Court reasoned, “[a]s to materiality, therefore, the class is entirely cohesive: It will prevail or fail
in unison.”119 As a result, the Court concluded that Rule 23(b)(3) did not stand in the way of
certification. Indeed, the role of 23(b)(3) is to determine only which method of adjudication is
best and not to adjudicate the case in its entirety.120
Three other aspects of the Court’s opinion are worth noting. First, the Court responded to
Amgen’s policy argument that the failure to adopt its view would result in unwarranted
settlement pressure. The Court emphasized that Congress dealt with this issue through the
PSLRA and did not choose to require early proof of materiality (or loss causation). Instead, the
Court stated that it had “no warrant to encumber securities fraud litigation by adopting a textual
requirement of precertification proof of materiality that Congress, despite its extensive
involvement in the securities field, has not sanctioned.”121
Second, the Court rejected Amgen’s argument that proof of materiality at class
certification would conserve judicial resources, stating that, in fact, “Amgen’s position … would
waste judicial resources.” The Court’s point here is that increasing the focus on procedural
resolutions of these claims complicates the litigation. Specifically, the Court noted that elevating
proof of materiality (or loss causation) to the class certification stage would create more, not less,
litigation, resulting in “a mini-trial at class certification … [that] would entail considerable
expenditures of judicial time and resources, costs scarcely anticipated by Federal Rule of Civil
114

Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191.

115

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191.
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Id.
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This is the classic test for 23(b)(3).

119

Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191.
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Id. See also Langevoort, supra note 13.
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Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1202.
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Procedure 23(c)(1)(A), which instructs that the decision whether to certify a class action be made
‘at an early practicable time.’”122
Finally, four justices dissented or concurred in Amgen raising a broader question that set
the stage for Halliburton II. Justice Alito’s concurrence pointed out that the majority did not
“revisit” Basic or the fraud-on-the-market presumption. 123 He then noted that recent evidence
“suggest[ed]” that the market efficiency presumption might rest on a faulty economic premise,124
referring to Justice Thomas’s dissent, which Justices Kennedy and Scalia, in part, joined. The
four justices appeared to be calling for an opportunity to overturn Basic, and within months, the
Court granted certiorari in Halliburton II.125 A holding in line with the four justices would
effectively eliminate securities class actions, and, thus, raised heightened interest in the Court’s
Halliburton II deliberations.
4.

Halliburton II: Affirming the Basic Presumption and Rejecting Proof, but
Allowing Rebuttal, of Presumption at Class Certification

Halliburton I and Amgen paved the way for a full-on assault on Basic and the fraud-onthe-market presumption. They created the space for a robust challenge to the existence of 10b-5
securities fraud class actions. Halliburton II posed the question about proving market efficiency
at the class certification stage, but that was not the issue on most minds at the time the case was
argued. Instead, the focus was on whether the Court would eliminate the fraud-on-the-market
presumption altogether.126

122

Id. at 1201. The series of cases discussed here are proof of that issue. Dura was filed in 1999, went
before the Supreme Court in 2005 and was resolved through settlement in 2009. Jocelyn Allison, $14M
Settlement Reached in Dura Securities Suit, LAW 360 (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://www.law360.com/articles/93418/14m-settlement-reached-in-dura-securities-suit. Amgen was filed
in 2007, went before the Supreme Court in 2013 and remains unresolved as of 2015. Complaint for
Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, No. CV 07
2536 PSG (PLAx), 2007 WL 4966000 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. at
1204. Halliburton was filed in 2001, went before the Supreme Court in 2011 and 2014 and remains
unresolved as of 2015. Class Action Complaint for Violation of Federal Securities Laws, Halliburton Co.
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1204 (2013). Note, however, that Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion did state
that Congress had rejected the opportunity to revisit market efficiency.
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Id.
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Id. at 1206-15 (2013). This is an argument that the majority addressed and rebuffed, pointing out that
Congress implicitly approved of the fraud-on-the-market presumption when it adopted the PSLRA. Id. at
1200.
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Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Cases to Watch: Where Halliburton Might Make Its Mark, LAW 360 (June
23, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/670778/cases-to-watch-where-halliburton-might-make-itsmark.
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The blockbuster possibility of Halliburton II failed to materialize. Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion reaffirmed the core holdings of Basic:127 the element of reliance provides a
connection between a misstatement and a purchase or sale; the traditional common law form of
reliance poses an unnecessarily unreasonable burden; and the rebuttable presumption of market
reliance resolves the issue in an appropriate fashion for these anonymous transactions.128 The
Court also rejected the defendants’ effort to require the plaintiff to prove price impact at class
certification in order to invoke the presumption, noting that requirement would “effectively
jettison half of the presumption.”129 Nevertheless, and in contravention of its expressed concern
in Amgen about mini-trials, the Court held that the defendants were entitled to the opportunity at
class certification to disprove market efficiency, referring to it as price impact, and creating
confusion about the possible conflation of reliance, materiality, and loss causation.130 As a result,
the term, price impact, defined, but unused in Halliburton I, and not used in Amgen, becomes the
point of contest left open in Halliburton II.131
Recall that before we detoured to Amgen, the Court had remanded Halliburton I, noting
that any arguments properly preserved remained available to Halliburton.132 Thus, on remand,
the defendants argued that class certification remained inappropriate. The core of their argument
was that the evidence that they used to attempt to disprove loss causation revealed that the
alleged misstatements did not impact the price of the stock.133 The lack of a price impact at Time
2, they argued, rebutted the Time 1, Basic presumption, created a situation in which individual
issues predominated over common ones, and defeated the use of the class action mechanism.134
The District Court rejected that argument and held that the defendants could not defeat
class certification by forcing the plaintiffs to prove (or allowing defendants to disprove) the
reliance element before the merits stage.135 The Fifth Circuit, relying on Amgen, affirmed.136
127

Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
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Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407-08, 2417.
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Id. at 2414

130

Id. at 2417.
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See Fisch, supra note 13; Langevoort, supra note 13.
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Halliburton II, 131 S. Ct. at 2187.

Defendants’ Brief Opposing Class Certification and, in the Alternative, Request to Supplement the
Record at 1, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M,
2012 WL 565997 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
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Defendants’ Brief Opposing Class Certification and, in the Alternative, Request to Supplement the
Record at 2-3, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152M, 2012 WL 565997 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
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WL 565997 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
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According to both courts, the defendants could use the price impact evidence at trial, where
actual proof is required, but not at class certification.137
The defendants again petitioned for, and gained a grant of certiorari from the Supreme
Court. And, unlike in Amgen, when the Court pushed the defendants back to trial for
materiality, the Court opened a window for yet another fight at class certification.139 To do so,
the Court distinguished materiality from reliance, stating that materiality is “an objective issue
susceptible to common, class wide proof.”140 All plaintiffs rise and fall together with a material
or immaterial misstatement, defeating the claim on the merits. In contrast, the Court opined,
price impact differs from materiality, because price impact is fundamental to Basic’s premise. “It
thus has everything to do with the issue of predominance at the class certification stage … and
must be proved before class certification.”141 Although the first part of the Court’s opinion
affirmed the Basic reliance presumption and, thus, the class-action mechanism, the last part left
space for the defendants to rebut the presumption – at the class certification stage and thus,
before there is a trial or a jury.142 In reaching its holding, the Court focused on price impact, 143
or more properly, the absence of price impact, as a term that it defined to provide the common
link from Basic that would enable the reliance presumption.
138

This review of the cases reveals that defendants’ dragnet for issues that can be decided at
an early stage of litigation has reached almost every element of the traditional fraud claim, with
materiality, reliance, and loss causation scrutinized for requirements about what the plaintiff
must prove to invoke the presumption of Basic at class certification. We know from Halliburton
I that loss causation is not on the list,144 and from Amgen that materiality is not either.145
Halliburton II tells us that plaintiffs continue to be entitled to the presumption of reliance, but at
the same time, the Court gives prominence to the term price impact and permits defendants to
deploy it to rebut the presumption at class certification.146
As a group, these three cases, along with Dura, all contain narrow holdings. Until
Halliburton II, the Court avoided the big issue left open in Basic: rebuttal of the presumption.
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Id. at 433.
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that the “the first three prerequisites [of what must be shown to get the Basic presumption] are directed at
price impact -- whether the alleged misrepresentation affected the market price in the first place.” This
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Although the Court recognized space for rebuttal in Halliburton II, we still do not know what
proof of the requisite connection between an open-market purchase and a misrepresentation will
look like. As a result, although Halliburton II narrowed the field of play, price impact, a largely
undeveloped term, now has the potential to create confusion, complexity and mini-trials focused
on econometric studies.147 Before turning to those concerns in Part IV, however, we first develop
the growth of the term price impact and its meaning in relation to Time 1.
B.

The Growth of Price Impact.

As Halliburton II makes clear, the term price impact is now on steroids, and, as a result, a
more detailed understanding of its role and growth is necessary. The story has a humble
beginning in the prerequisites for the presumption of reliance that first appear in a footnote to
Basic. Price impact is not among the prerequisites listed. Instead, it merits only an indirect
reference in the discussion of how the presumption might be rebutted. More than twenty years
later Halliburton I and Amgen treat the presumption prerequisites cavalierly and their
relationship to price impact even more so. In short, the Court ducks the hard question as to the
requirements for the causal relationship between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ trading
loss in an open-market transaction. This section of the Article follows the Court’s stunted
development of price impact in these cases. Then, in Part IV, we engage in the theoretical
discussions about the securities class action, developing the goals of securities regulation in the
context of publicness as well as the role of market efficiency/market intermediation in securities
transactions and litigation. We then apply those constructs to the price-impact element.
The starting point for the role of price impact is the discussion about the requirements
necessary to establish Basic’s presumption of reliance, which the Halliburton II Court collapsed
to price impact.148 Basic relegated this key issue to a footnote, and even there, it did little more
than restate the view of the Court of Appeals.149
The elements listed in footnote 27 are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

That the defendant made public misrepresentations;
That the misrepresentations were material;
That the shares were traded on an efficient market;
That the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to
misjudge the value of the shares; and
5. That the plaintiff traded between the time the misrepresentations were
made and the time the truth was revealed. 150
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See Fisch, supra note 13; Langevoort, supra note 13; see also Pritchard & Sale, supra note 71.

See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416 (“Price impact is thus an essential precondition for any Rule
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The Supreme Court promptly cut that list from five to four, concluding that its holding as to
materiality in an earlier part of the Basic opinion would collapse elements 2 and 4 into one.151
Price impact is only mentioned later, when the Court addresses rebuttal of the reliance
presumption. There, the Court refers to three disjunctive paths listed by the lower court, stating
that the defendants could “rebut proof of the elements giving rise to the presumption, or show the
misrepresentation in fact did not lead to the distortion of price, or that an individual plaintiff
traded or would have traded despite his knowing the statement was false.”152 The Basic Court
then concluded that “any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and
either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price,
will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”153
The Court also provides three examples of potential rebuttals. The first is a situation in
which market makers were privy to the truth about the merger discussions, and as a result, the
market would not have been affected when the news became public.154 The second is when news
of the merger credibly entered the market through another source and dissipated the effects of the
misstatement.155 The third is when a plaintiff believed Basic’s statements were false, but sold
because of unrelated concerns, e.g. potential antitrust problems.156
We know from their correspondence that Justices Blackmun and Brennan (two of the
four in the majority) engaged in a vigorous debate about the strength of the causal link required
to show reliance in market transactions and particularly the conditions for this rebuttal. For
Brennan even if there were reasons other than the fraud that the plaintiff’s traded, the reduced
amount that plaintiff received is sufficiently connected to the defendant’s wrongful conduct as to
permit recovery under 10b-5. 157 For Blackmun such a trader had been injured (the
misrepresentation having led to a lower price than the investor would have received in a market
with no fraud) but was not defrauded (i.e. the loss and the wrongful conduct were not sufficiently
151
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connected).158 Both justices agreed that there was little practical difference in their two
positions—which related only to the space available to the defendant to rebut the presumption of
reliance that both justices agreed was appropriate in an open market setting, a rebuttal they
believed would be very difficult or impractical for defendants. 159 Yet, this narrow, even esoteric,
rebuttal space remained and gained new attention as discussed below when the Court reaffirmed
Basic is 2014...
Twenty-three years after Basic the Supreme Court elevated the elements necessary to
gain the presumption of reliance from the Basic footnote to the text of the Halliburton I opinion,
but inexplicably dropped materiality.160 Price impact was now expressly identified by the Court,
albeit indirectly. Recall from the discussion in Part III, A above, that the Halliburton defendants
argued the 5th Circuit had not really focused on loss causation (which the Supreme Court held
was not a requirement to gain the presumption of reliance) but rather price impact (which the
defendant argued should be a requirement to gain the presumption).161 The Court rejected that
reading of what the 5th Circuit had done and then proceeded to define price impact, stating that,
“Price impact simply refers to the effect of a misrepresentation on a stock price.”162 Next, the
Court drew in reliance (an issue not before it), stating that: “if a misrepresentation [did] not
affect the market price, an investor [could not] be said to have relied on a misrepresentation
merely because he purchased at that price.”163 In short, this means that a price unaffected by
fraud does not reflect fraud. Although the Court did not express a view on Halliburton’s
argument, this rendition of the argument leaves room for price impact in the form of price
support, or propping up a price, to be distinguished from moving the price up or down. Simply
See Letter from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan at 2 (January 25, 1988). Blackmun’s letter
identified two reasons why the presumption did not apply, both of which are reflected in his opinion in
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have received absent the misrepresentation).” Blackmun had made the same point in his first response to
Brennan. See Letter from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan at 2 (January 15, 1988) (on file with
author) (“the presumption of reliance depends on a link between the misrepresentation and the injury. If
the defendant can prove that either the price would not have changed or that a particular plaintiff would
have traded at the ‘incorrect’ price nonetheless, he should be entitled to rebut the presumption.”)
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put, the fact that a price does not move does not mean that there was no price distortion or
impact. Instead, the lack of movement may be price impact in the form of price maintenance.
In Amgen, where materiality was at the core of the case, the Court did some backing and
filling with respect to its omission of materiality in the Halliburton I list of requirements for the
presumption of reliance. Amgen lists four elements as necessary to gain the presumption of
reliance: (1) publicity; (2) materiality; (3) efficient market; and (4) trade timing.164 The fourth
element, trade timing, or a requirement that the plaintiff trade between the time of the
misrepresentation and the correction, is now described as an inquiry into adequacy of
representation and is not tied to the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).165
Of the remaining three elements, the Court finds one, materiality, cannot be contested at
class certification. The Court’s rationale was that if materiality failed, it would prevent all
plaintiffs from suing, and did not, therefore, “give rise to any prospect of individual questions
overwhelming common [questions].”166 The other two, publicity and market efficiency, remain
contestable at class certification.167 The Amgen Court did not specifically discuss materiality’s
possible overlap with price impact except to say that “immaterial information, by definition, does
not affect market price.” 168
Finally, Halliburton II completes the movement of the predicates of Basic’s footnote 27
to center stage. The fourth element, trade timing, is confirmed as within the zone of typicality
and adequacy.169 Importantly, the Court took the first three predicates—publicity, materiality,
and market efficiency—and presented them as price impact, previously defined in Halliburton
I.170 Then, the Court gave them significant new importance when it stated that, “[i]n the absence
of price impact, Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory and presumption of reliance collapse.”171
Of course, given the holding in Amgen, the Court faced a situation in which it now put
publicity, materiality, and market efficiency together as directed toward price impact, but had
previously carved off materiality as unsuitable for class certification. The result is that the same
164
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substantive inquiry bearing one label is pushed back to the merits, but with another label could
be considered at class-certification. We return to this issue in Part IV.
Finally, the Halliburton II Court also deployed an example of the role of price impact in
determining market efficiency, and here is where the contradictions begin to grow. The Court
posited a situation in which the defendants submitted event studies that examined the price of the
stock in relation to six events.172 If one of the studies examined the alleged misrepresentation and
revealed no price impact at Time 1, and the other five studies showed price impact, then the
Court concluded that it would face a situation in which both the market was efficient and the
misstatement alleged in the complaint had no price impact.173 The Court then pointed out that the
result in that situation, absent the opportunity for the defendants to rebut the presumption, would
be certification even though the “fraud-on-the-market-theory does not apply and common
reliance thus cannot be presumed.”174
The Court’s analysis is problematic unless it is reframed to include price stabilization.
The Court’s discussion here and its prior discussion of price impact in Halliburton I do not
directly address price stabilization. Yet, in the prototypical fraud case where, for example,
misstatements continue a trend of positive news, the price impact can be price maintenance with
little to no movement. That is the fact pattern in the Halliburton cases (and in Amgen and in
Dura).175 Thus, to make sense of the Court’s use of price impact, we have to reconcile it with the
Court’s failure to address price stabilization/maintenance and its role in most fraud cases.
In sum, the Court’s development of the predicates for Basic’s presumption and its use of
price impact as a proxy for those elements reveals a pattern of initial inattention and sloppiness
about the elements of the presumption that then left space for litigants to make use of procedural
mechanisms to plumb the intricacies of the presumption. Not surprisingly, that is what they are
doing. Shortly after Halliburton II was decided, courts began to apply it, ruling that defendants
could attempt to prove the lack of price impact at class certification. For example, Regions Bank
won review of the issue in a case involving its merger with AmSouth Bancorp.176 Halliburton
won a similar right, leading to subsequent class certification for one of the claims but not five
172
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others.177 And, in the case of AIG, which had been stayed pending the outcome of Halliburton II,
the company quickly agreed to a $960 million settlement in a case involving representations
about credit default swaps.178
The task of courts attempting to resolve these questions has been exacerbated by the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to explicate the reliance connection that is sufficient for open-market
fraud relief in today’s public markets. Defendants continue to occupy the space created by this
ambiguity by pushing for new issues to be decided at class certification, including, for example,
an argument for requiring a showing of an effective measure of damages. Recently, a Texas
federal court declined to certify a class, focusing on how an event study would incorporate
various theories of liability.179 This opinion, along with the ones described in this Article, are
examples of what Professor Don Langevoort has described as litigation taking the form of a
repeat “game of whack-a-mole.”180 To make sense of this game then, an understanding of the
theory of market regulation, as well as the theory of market efficiency and market intermediation
and its role in class actions, is necessary. We turn there next.
IV.

MARKET INTERMEDIATION AND THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION

The Court’s affirmance of Basic in Halliburton II makes clear that the securities class
action as enabled by market efficiency is here to stay. Nevertheless, this area of the law still
suffers from gaps and a missing set of guiding principles to unify our understanding of the
securities class action. We develop those principles in this part of the Article. We begin by
exploring the goals of securities regulation that are generally deployed in theoretical discussions
of the securities class action—investor protection and corporate governance—and then add to
those a set of additional goals that focus not only on investors but on the market and its stability
more generally. These latter goals are in the publicness space about which each of the authors
has previously written.181 We argue that publicness helps to explain the more robust goals of
securities regulation as well as the role of the class action in enforcement and deterrence.
Next, we develop the market’s role as an intermediary on both the front and back end of
securities regulation. That role, it turns out, is important to understanding the evolution of the
common law tort of fraud into today’s fraud-on-the-market based 10b-5 class action, as well as
the specific issue of price impact. The market as intermediary and the correlative efficient market
theory play an enabling role in the front-end, disclosure regulation space. As a result, market
177
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efficiency and market intermediation enable and facilitate both offerings and enforcement of
securities regulation. We conclude, therefore, that because most securities transactions in public
corporations now occur in open, anonymous, and increasingly sophisticated public markets, the
regulatory and enforcement mechanisms have also evolved, and must continue to do so, to
recognize the market as an intermediary in those processes. The result is a market intermediation
substitute in both the regulatory and the enforcement/class-action contexts that encompasses
publicness in order to support economic growth through strong markets and innovation.
Finally, we turn to a specific discussion of the 10b-5 class action and the reliance
element, developing a construct of the doctrine in the securities regulatory world where
publicness plays a role. Here, we create an analytic framework for the 10b-5 tort’s evolution,
again with particular attention to the role of market intermediation. We then deploy the construct
of the market as intermediary in the more limited context of price impact, providing an example
of how market intermediation and publicness can help to resolve questions in securities class
actions.
A.

The Publicness of Securities Regulation and Enforcement

We begin by adding to the theoretical work about the role of regulation and enforcement
in the securities class action context. Many of our colleagues in the academy have explored
securities regulatory goals and securities class actions, concluding that investor protection and
corporate governance/agency cost arguments provide varying degrees of support (or lack of
support) for a theory of these claims.182 Investor protection, of course, is an important aspect of
the class action and is also a core securities regulatory concern more generally. Nevertheless, as
the most recent market crash reveals, the system is larger than any one issuer, or set of investors,
and the choices of issuers have serious and lasting impacts beyond just investors who invest in
any one company. As a result, although we begin with investor protection and corporate
governance and their place in the regulatory impulse, we expand the discussion to goals focused
less on investor-specific concerns and more on developing strong and healthy markets and
enabling innovation and growth. These goals are less about investors per se, and more about the
larger society or publicness. The idea is that issuers both impact and are impacted by the market
and forces outside those of the individual entity.183
Publicness, we argue here, has become part of the securities regulatory impulse. As the
extremely slow recovery and lagging economic growth after the 2008-2009 financial crisis have
182

See William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 69 (2011); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation,
2009 WISC. L. REV. 333 (2009); Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When
Issuers Do Not Trade, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 299 (2009); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe. Public and
Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. OF FIN. ECON. 207 (2009);
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003); Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities
Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 724-25 (2014).
183

See supra notes 17-18for a discussion of publicness.

33

HILLARY A. SALE & ROBERT B. THOMPSON
revealed, strong markets are key to innovation and growth. In the U.S. system, we have chosen a
disclosure-based regulatory system to address the issues that might otherwise hinder the
development of strong, healthy capital markets. Those regulations are generally on the frontend—the offering side of securities transactions. They are complemented by enforcement, both
government/public and private, e.g. class actions. After developing the discussion of the goals
and regulatory choices, we will turn to deterrence and the role of the class action in providing
back-end securities regulation.184
Investor protection has long been linked to the securities class action. The litigation roots
of the 10b-5 claims are in traditional torts based on personal economic injury and have continued
to evolve as the claim has been redefined as a class action focused on more collective decisions
reflecting market intermediation of investor choices. Although we do not recount all of the
investor protection arguments here, the thrust is the class action’s effectiveness in protecting
investors—despite its shortcomings, including a lack of significant compensation and potentially
excessive costs for a largely diversified investor pool. We acknowledge these issues, though, as
we explore in Part B of this Section, many reforms to the securities class action have worked to
reduce these concerns.185
In the core securities setting, when an investor is buying or selling securities, regulation
addresses informational asymmetries—issuers and their managers (and sometimes other traders)
know more about the intangible interests being traded, and these parties’ incentives to disclose
are less than perfect.186 Offerors have inadequate incentives to disclose for various reasons,
including, for example, worries about revealing valuable information that competitors can use.187
In addition, shares traded in the market are not fungible across companies. The value of one
company is different from another, and investors are not all experts or commercial operators.188
Disclosure helps to fill the gaps between offerors and investors, and standardized disclosures
allow investors to compare offerors to each other before investing. Regulations that cut across
issuers help to create a baseline from which all offerors and investors can operate on an equal
basis, without fear of the competitive concerns or the impact of private costs of disclosure on
184
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investors, also have aspects of publicness.189 A socially optimal level of disclosure, and one that
is evenly applied, arguably requires a public mandatory system, rather than private ordering.190
Good disclosures, with the market as an intermediary, will in turn attract capital and facilitate
growth and innovation.
Securities regulations directed toward corporate governance (think proxy regulations, for
example) extend investor protection beyond the buying or selling context. Investors who buy
shares become shareholders with governance concerns about the entity. For example, when there
is a specialization of function in these entities and managers have control over large amounts of
the investors’ money, there is a gap between the interests of these two sets of participants. Thus,
one of the goals of securities regulation is tied to corporate governance, with the idea that a
strong securities disclosure system can help monitor corporate managers and agency costs.191
Securities regulation through mandatory and equal disclosure will decrease the monitoring costs
that investors face,192 and that, in turn, will help the market to attract capital and improve capital
allocation.193 Here again private class action litigation aids in enforcement, helping to police
disclosures and creating pressure on the officers and directors to be forthright in information
provision. Disclosure and enforcement that mediate the space between investors and issuers are
also in the publicness space, creating a market that attracts issuers as well as the capital of
investors more broadly.
The securities regulatory impulse also supports goals beyond investor protection and
corporate governance to include market development and innovation, as well as economic
growth. These goals reflect how investor/shareholders share the benefits of regulation along with
other groups in society. Securities regulations and disclosure, for example, aid in price setting
and, thus, allocative efficiency.194 Capital is scarce, and pricing is important to achieving an
efficient allocation of it.195 The idea is that if we calibrate disclosure properly and ensure its
evenness, the result will be to improve the accuracy of the pricing of securities, where accuracy
is about pricing that corresponds with the value of the companies.196 Of course, in economic
189
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terms, an efficient allocation of capital will allow the issuers to access capital and to grow and,
thereby, promote economic growth overall and redound to the benefit of individual investors as
well.197 Securities regulation can also decrease the cost of capital by increasing transparency and
diminishing informational asymmetries.198 As a result, potential shareholders get easier and
equal access to information, and that, in turn, facilitates investment, again, across companies and
the market.199 Thus, the benefit of the regulation is a public, as well as a private, one, a form of
publicness, and an outcome that is a public benefit exceeding the private benefit of disclosure.200
Disclosure and allocative efficiency are also important to the development and
maintenance of a competitive and active capital market and a competitive market, in turn,
improves access to capital and promotes innovation.201 Evidence supports the idea that countries
with active securities markets have higher levels of economic growth, which, in turn, favor
innovation and new entrants into the market.202 Thus, to the extent that disclosure allocates
capital and facilitates an active market, it also helps to promote growth and innovation – the
point of the regulation in the first place and another way in which publicness undergirds the
goals of the regulatory system.203
Even the more specific investor protection goals with which we started have a publicness
component. Securities regulation and enforcement both facilitate investor confidence more
generally, which is vital to belief in the market and, thereby, to growth and innovation.204
Consider the roots of the federal securities laws. The initial set of securities laws arose after the
1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression that followed.205 There was a perception that
the Depression may have been prolonged by a lack of confidence in the markets.206 No one,
issuer or shareholder, wants to participate in a rigged market.207 Thus, regulation to preserve and
maintain investor confidence helps to build strong and fluid markets.208 This need for investor
protection beyond individual transactions grows as the number of market participants grows, and
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with more than half of the households in the United States owning equities either directly or
through mutual funds or retirement accounts, its importance has increased.209 Indeed, although
investor protection is at the core here, the impulse extends beyond the traditional issuer/investor,
purchaser/seller context, to a larger concern about markets generally, as well as the deadening
effect of crashes on growth. This is yet another example of how, as the number of investors
increases and the concerns about market and economic growth broaden, publicness acquires a
greater importance in the regulatory scheme.
In fact, when Congress described the necessity for regulation in the 1934 Act, its focus
was not just investor effects but “national emergencies, which produce widespread
unemployment and the dislocations of trade, transportation and industry…and adversely affect
the general welfare.”210 The national economic collapse that followed the financial crisis in 2008,
and the Dodd-Frank Act enacted in response to it, reflected a similar publicness focus with the
added concerns of systemic risk and financial stability.
These latter concerns are arguably the most robust in terms of publicness.211 In many
financial institutions securities transactions are intertwined with those in adjacent regulatory
areas; when one collapses (or comes near to collapse) others can as well.212 The result, as in
2008, is financial instability and systemic risk, and the prescription in Dodd-Frank in 2010 was
regulatory oversight.213 There are many critics of the regulatory system and whether the U.S. has
achieved an appropriate regulatory structure and balance;214 nevertheless, there is general
agreement that oversight is necessary to help prevent excessive risk taking and the jeopardy to
stability that risks can create.215 As a result, regulation and publicness go hand in hand.
B.

Market Efficiency Theory, Market Intermediation, Deterrence, and Securities
Regulation

The key means to achieve the securities regulatory goals just described have been
disclosures coupled with effective enforcement of those obligations.216 The Rule 10b-5 class
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action is key to the private enforcement of those obligations.217 We begin this section by
exploring the role that market efficiency has played in both disclosure and enforcement. To do
so, we develop the concept of market intermediation, focusing on the market as an essential actor
and accepted intermediary between issuers and investors both in enforcement and disclosure.
The direct contact between buyer and seller visible in the structure of the original securities laws
has given way to a mostly indirect relationship intermediated through markets. As a result,
investor communication has moved far from its original, direct contact focus, and fraud
enforcement has come to focus on the collective relationship more than the individual, and in
doing so, has reshaped expectations about and the theoretical foundations of the private cause of
action. Market efficiency concepts are important to both the front end and back end of securities
regulation.
In the middle part of this section we set out the hybrid rationale that has replaced the
compensation theory and is based on deterrence to provide the desired enforcement. Deterrence
here follows from private class actions pursued by investors who have economic losses and Rule
10b-5 standing, but whose claims are bounded by procedural limits to prevent the possibility of
over-deterrence through excessive payments to mostly diversified claimants. Finally, we argue
that the collective focus flowing from the market-based intermediation characteristics of today’s
securities transactions, combined with deterrence enforcement concerns, pushes the traditional
investor protection goals of securities regulation much closer to the construct of publicness goals
we elucidated above.
Securities disclosure regulations have evolved to reflect, to a much greater degree than at
its origins, the intermediary role of the market, with market efficiency as a proxy just as it is in
the class action context. Consider, first, the initial (1933) approach to offering disclosures.
Required disclosures had to be complete and distinct from any other disclosure regardless of
issuer size. Documents had to be placed into the hands of potential and actual investors.218
Today, the integrated disclosure system means that information required by the 1933 Act can be
met by disclosures pursuant to the 1934 Act, and these disclosures no longer need be provided
directly to prospective purchasers.219 One of the key aspects of the integrated disclosure reforms
is the Form S-3, the filing required for equity issuances by large issuers like, for example,
Halliburton.220 Form S-3 greatly abbreviated the disclosures required for offerings by eligible
including broker dealer regulation, other limits on the sales process, internal controls, etc. that is left for
discussion elsewhere.
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filers, allowing them to incorporate prior filings by reference.221 The idea here is that those
companies are heavily traded and followed and release considerable information that is
impounded into stock prices and into the market on a regular basis.222
The SEC’s adopting release for the integrated-disclosure regulations specifically cited the
efficient market theory in support of its deregulatory changes.223 The release, in fact, went even
further, stating that the “market operates efficiently for S-3 companies,”224 and disclosures from
the companies are “disseminated and accounted for by the marketplace.”225 This is an
information-impoundment theory of market efficiency. The explicit reliance on the efficient
market theory, even if overstated,226 lends support to our theory that belief in some measure of
market efficiency through information-impoundment, and the correlative innovation and growth,
is both a front-end and a back-end aspect of securities regulation and, arguably, important to the
publicness aspect of the market.227
The SEC’s reliance on market efficiency in propounding this rule change is important for
another reason as well. It reveals industry’s reliance on market intermediation. The SEC adopted
this rule change in response to deregulatory pressure, and reliance on the theory of market
efficiency helped to justify a pro-industry change.228 As a result, integrated disclosure became a
cost-savings measure for issuers and is now an ingrained aspect of our regulatory system. Thus,
for the issuers who rely on this front-end, market intermediation, measure, it is arguably
221
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disingenuous to claim a lack of similar intermediation on the back end when deterrence and
enforcement – and belief in the market are at stake.229
Form S-3 and integrated disclosure are not the only places where market intermediation
plays a front-end, offering-based role. Consider Rule 415 for shelf offerings.230 This Rule is also
part of the integration reforms and here, too, the SEC referred explicitly to market efficiency in
its adopting release.231 This Rule allows issuers to register securities on a delayed basis,
essentially stating that the issuer plans, at some point, when the market is favorable, to sell
securities, and the continuous disclosure regime of the 1934 Act provides the requisite
disclosures.232 The provision increases issuer flexibility and options, as well as increasing cost
savings.233 It, too, was premised on the connection between information impoundment and stock
prices,234 and it is now an ingrained part of the regulatory system.
Similarly, the 2005 offering reforms, which provided fewer restrictions on the offering
process for publicly traded companies than for their counterparts making their initial public
offering, are also arguably based on market intermediation, even if not explicitly. 235 Thus, the
argument goes, the informational asymmetries and other investor protection concerns are fewer
and the need for regulatory layers less.236 The same might also be said of the decision to decrease
holding periods for the resale of restricted securities of companies making required periodic
disclosures to the market.237 As a result, these provisions rely at least indirectly on the market
intermediation and the market efficiency theory. Here, too, the idea is that information on these
companies is already available and a market already exists for their securities.238 In short,
information impoundment, market efficiency, and market intermediation loom in the background
of many front-end offering regulations and reforms.
To be sure, our understanding of market efficiency, or at least that of the finance
theorists, has changed since the time of Basic.239 We know that the assumptions undergirding
229
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the theory of market efficiency – complete information and rational actors – are more nuanced
than some of the initial broad presentations of the theory. Information is costly.240 Transaction
costs exist.241 Noise plays a role in the markets.242 And, people trade in securities for many
reasons that are not rational.243 Nevertheless, our reliance on these market theories remains, both
on the front-end, offering side, and, as Halliburton II made clear, on the back-end, enforcement
side.
The reason for this continued reliance, we believe, is that the goals for regulation, both
investor-oriented and publicness in nature, as well as the need for belief in market efficiency and
fairness are too important to discard. As a result, the regulatory system deploys market efficiency
to elide gaps in theory, to enable both capital raising and deregulation. A similar pattern is visible
on the deterrence/enforcement side, with litigation that supports the goals of securities
regulation. Efficiency on the front end thus implies efficiency on the back end, an example of the
type of second-best theoretical solution that is the nature of the regulatory enterprise and
litigation more generally.
Class action theory has easily adjusted to the widespread acceptance of the intermediary
role of the market in disclosure and enforcement just discussed. But some effects of the growth
in the sophistication of markets and their participants since the inception of the federal securities
laws have created additional challenges for theories seeking to explain the class action. As
discussed in Part II, a compensation theory alone cannot support the class-action mechanism as it
currently works.244 It is widely understood that the investors who receive payments receive only
a small percentage of their alleged losses.245 Payments in this context tend to be circular, with
today’s shareholders paying the settlement costs of harms to yesterday’s, with attorneys’ fees
law); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 228 (providing historical analysis of growth and use of efficient
capital markets hypothesis in regulation and litigation).
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reducing the payments.246 In short, compensation really does not occur and, as a result, cannot be
used as a justification for the class-action regime.
The same, however, cannot be said of deterrence. Indeed, Congress reiterated the role of
deterrence and the importance of the class action in that space when it passed the PSLRA.247 The
Supreme Court did the same in opinions discussed in this Article.248 Even if less than “optimal,”
deterrence, whether actual or perceived, continues to have considerable traction in the debates
about the class action.249 This is true even though it is well understood that the lack of payments
by individual officers and directors, and the role of insurance, likely diminish the specific
deterrence value of the claims250 and that the specific application of deterrence theories lack the
necessary nuance to sustain a general theory.251
Many academics have raised these concerns. Professors Jackson and Roe describe the
conventional academic view of securities litigation as “seriously compromised.”252 Professor
Fisch presents the academic literature as reflecting a “general consensus that the traditional
justifications for private litigation are deficient and that the rationale for private litigation must
be reconsidered.”253 And there have been many proposals for what would work better: enhanced
government enforcement; SEC approval of class actions;254 stock exchanges in charge of
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deterrence;255 sanctions against managers personally;256 or regulation of incentives of those who
bring suits.257
The Supreme Court is seemingly untroubled by such inconsistencies; the Congress has
hardly batted an eye toward any of the alternative solutions. Instead, what we have is a hybrid
private class action with elements of deterrence as a form of enforcement and some minimal
compensation, built on the frame of what has gone before and adapted to do justice in the
securities transaction world we have. In short, class actions provide shareholders recovery (and
attorneys with a share of it) for losses after misrepresentations. But, they also function as a
necessary and effective deterrent of misconduct that adversely affects the market as a whole.
Indeed, the class action has become a known commodity in the deterrence arsenal in a way that
public enforcement has not matched. Now, investors who purchased or sold after a
misrepresentation and who meet the elements of Rule 10b-5, have standing to bring a cause of
action under the holding of Blue Chip Stamps, assuming they have an economic loss meeting the
prerequisites of Dura. Nevertheless, the scienter pleading requirements and other provisions of
the PSLRA permit the weeding out of many questionable suits before discovery and its expense
even begin.258 Further, the elements of materiality and loss causation, even though pushed back
to a later time in the litigation process, shape anticipated damages for any settlement discussions.
These changes have combined to diminish, but not eliminate, the circularity concerns of the
diversified investors—including attorney’s fees and litigation costs—who are potentially on both
sides of these cases. For these, we are left with a choice: deterrence through litigation as
compared to the costs and benefits for other alternatives, including, for example, the
development of a merits-based, front-end regulatory system – a choice the U.S. has eschewed in
favor of disclosure and back-end fraud enforcement.259
Finally, this is where our expansion of the theory of the securities regulatory impulse to
include publicness goals comes into play. The reason for the resilience of deterrence and the role
it plays, we posit, is that it is connected to the goals of investor protection and market regulation
and to publicness. And, here is where the class action has evolved and where our understanding
255
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of deterrence must also evolve. We need to assure all investors, not just individual ones or even
issuer-specific ones, that the market is “policed” so that they will be encouraged to invest.260
Additionally, deterrence matters for those not in the market but impacted by crashes and
downturns. Enforcement and deterrence thus go hand-in-hand. In that sense, then, deterrence,
even if not easily measured, accomplished, or tied to specific harms, remains vital to the
securities regulatory goals, including the increasing role of publicness in those goals. Securities
fraud, if unchecked, creates a market in which no one, not offerors, buyers, or sellers, wants to
participate. Simply put, fairness, and the belief in it, matters to market participants and, thus, to
growth and innovation.
The answer to the application of Halliburton II, and the role of the securities class actions
more generally, then, lies in our acceptance of the need for strong securities markets that help to
generate innovation and growth. Class actions, as we have argued, play an important role in
policing and protecting the market and ensuring its strength. The market works to allocate capital
from investors to users. Issuers rely on the market, and indirectly, its efficiency and
intermediation, to access capital. Capital allocation, in turn, supports growth and innovation, but
only when belief in the market’s fairness is sustained. The result is that the class action, too, has
evolved to encompass publicness and, therefore, the emphasis on specific investor
harm/compensation has diminished, while the focus on deterrence of harm to the market or to a
larger class of diversified investors has grown.
Of course, our concerns about fairness, innovation, and growth, as well as about
information as a public good, support the disclosure, or front-end regulatory side we previously
discussed.261 Importantly, however, they also support the back-end, enforcement aspect as well –
by providing a mechanism to deter fraudulent disclosures, which harm the market, and belief in
it, as a whole. Viewed through the publicness lens, then, class actions play not just a direct,
investor protection role, they also play a larger role in policing and supporting the market, which
in turn fuels growth and innovation. It is for those reasons, we posit, that the securities fraud
class action endures and receives continued support from Congress and the Court. Although not
free from downsides, the class action is an important part of the mechanisms that protect the
market and thereby make it function as a place that attracts capital, issuers, and investors, which,
in turn, promotes innovation and growth for investors and citizens alike. In short, however
messy, the class action arguably endures because:
1. a strong market is important to growth through innovation and capital
allocation,
2. a belief in a “fair” and “efficient” market is a predicate to a strong market,
and
3. an enforcement regime, both public and private (class actions), is a
predicate to a belief in a strong market.

260

See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345-46 (2005).

261

See supra Part IV A.

44

MARKET INTERMEDIATION, PUBLICNESS, AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

C.

The Role of Market Intermediation in Reliance and Price Impact

As we noted earlier, the Rule 10b-5 class action is a back-end enforcement tool that has
endured repeated assaults by judges, legislators, regulators, practitioners, and academics. Dura,
Amgen, and both Halliburton cases are recent examples of the Court’s reluctance to make
wholesale changes to it in the post-PSLRA era. This reluctance is tied to both the goals of
regulation and the endurance of deterrence and enforcement concerns. Yet, like the regulatory
goals and the accompanying front-end regulatory structure, the class action’s role, as well as its
shape and requirements, has been shifting over the years. The evolving cause of action and the
role of the market in that evolution is where we turn next.
1.

Market Intermediation and the Evolution of 10b-5 Claims

The fraud-on-the-market theory generally, and the role of reliance more specifically, have
both developed along with the securities markets. Understanding the evolution of the cause of
action requires an examination of open-market trading and the role it plays in linking buyers and
sellers, both with respect to reliance and the measure of damages. Given the realities of openmarket, anonymous transactions, some aspects of the traditional common-law tort of fraud do
not, and cannot, directly apply. The claims of individual investors, even if made in direct reliance
on a misstatement, are rarely worth the cost of litigating and, therefore, are not litigated. As
previously stated, the class action remedies this collective-action problem and plays an important
enforcement role.262 The traditional understanding of reliance, however, was a challenge to the
development of an effective open-market collective claim. Its role was to provide a link between
purchasers and misstatements that would address concerns about overcompensation and
circularity, but it is not subject to proof in a traditional common-law manner, and, even if it were,
would be different for each and every person. As a result, it would defeat the predominance
requirement and, thereby, class certification. Here is where the fraud-on-the-market presumption
does its work. It facilitates the class action and thus, provides enforcement and a deterrence
check on fraud.263
These are the key core principles the Court reaffirmed in the key cases described in this
article. Halliburton II made clear that Basic’s presumption remains sound. As a group, the
opinions reiterate the policy reasons undergirding the fraud-on-the-market approach. In short,
relying on the market as an intermediary for the purposes of the reliance element is both
necessary and appropriate for open-market transactions.265
264
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different here than in traditional fraud cases. Open-market transactions are understandably
distinct from their common law counterparts. Market intermediation intervenes and leaves us
with the question of whether a causal connection should be required at all and, if so, what it
should look like.
Consider the development of market intermediation in securities fraud claims. Movement
away from the strictures of common law and toward recognition of the nature of market-based
transactions was occurring in the federal courts for more than two decades before Basic.266 The
Supreme Court first relaxed the reliance standard in securities claims in 1970.267 The specific use
of fraud on the market in 10b-5 cases was already well-accepted by the lower federal courts
when the Supreme Court embraced it.268 Academics had also begun to support its adoption. For
example, Professor Dan Fischel saw fraud on the market as an appealing approach to securities
fraud and the element of reliance as inconsistent with it.269 He was later joined in this view by his
frequent co-author and now federal judge, Frank Easterbrook.270 The result was that the
requirement of a transactional connection between fraudster and plaintiff gave way to a marketbased adaptation.271
That an adaptation should occur is not surprising – both in light of the way that torts have
evolved more generally,272 and the larger goals of securities and market regulation discussed
earlier. Torts scholars John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky describe how Basic replaced a
cause of action based on the injury of deceit, or being tricked to buy stock, with one based on
economic harm resulting from price distortions that follow defendant’s misrepresentations –
irrespective of reliance. This theory provides a broader notion of what can count as wrongful
injury, where reliance is not required, but the cause of action is still legitimate given
Congressional and Court action.273

266

See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968).

267

Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).

268

See, e.g., Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154
(3d Cir. 1986).
269

Dan Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1 (1982).
270

See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987). Professor Margaret Sachs has examined
Judge Easterbrook’s more restrictive look at the interaction of the merits and procedure after his academic
writing with Fischel and before his 2010 opinion in Schliecher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2010), an
opinion that is favorably cited in the Halliburton cases. See Margaret V. Sachs, Superstar Judges as
Entrepreneurs: The Untold Story of Fraud on the Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207 (2015).
271

Fisch, supra note 13.

272

Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29.

273

Id.

46

MARKET INTERMEDIATION, PUBLICNESS, AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

Within the securities academy some scholars have argued that the only link necessary to
satisfy reliance is one to a distortion in market price.274 Others have suggested eliminating
reliance entirely.275 The focus for the securities scholars, as for the torts scholars, is that the
investors’ relation to the fraud is intermediated through the market.276 This difference matters
because it shifts our focus from the personal to the market and from compensation to deterrence,
the theory we have described as key to market protection in a world of publicness.
This debate centers on whether the original purpose of reliance, linking a defendant’s
wrongdoing to a change in behavior of a specific injured party, is as important as it once was.
The work that reliance does in this market-centered circumstance is to prevent misrepresentors
from becoming insurers to all market purchasers.277 The concern lurking behind the reliance link
is about overcompensation with respect to individual purchasers who are now grouped into a
class. 278 Those concerns have, however, been addressed in multiple ways. Recall the role of the
PSLRA in dealing with overcompensation and the perceived strike-suit value of these claims.
Lead plaintiffs must now receive court approval. Complaints must survive stringent pleading
standards and are subject to a stay on discovery until they do so. Further, plaintiffs must still
prove loss causation, which provides a connection to the harm, and they must also prove
materiality and scienter.279 Although these reforms have generally been debated in the context of
strike suits and compensation when no fraud occurred, in fact, all of these reforms also help to
diminish the likelihood of overcompensation through circularity. After all, if we sort good from
bad claims at the front end of the litigation, and there is evidence that the process has
improved,280 it is reasonable to be less concerned about the damages on the back end. That
argument is, at least in part, what undergirds theories that support the elimination of reliance as
an element in market-based situations.
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The growth in scholarly literature against reliance in a market based 10b-5 claim, along
with what we now know was a vigorous debate among the justices in the majority in Basic,
nevertheless supports a continuing, if increasingly limited, role for reliance by providing for the
fraud on the market presumption to be rebuttable.281 The majority in Halliburton II provides for
this rebuttal to be contested at the class certification point of litigation.282 Yet, it turns out that in
light of the opinions we have analyzed in this Article, and the role of the market as intermediary,
the rebuttal space is appropriately, narrowly cabined.
As a result, the argument about reliance now goes something like this: scienter-based,
material misrepresentations that distort the market price usually give rise to a cause of action, but
some are too remote. The three examples that the Court provided in Basic tell us something
about what was worrying the Court. The first two indicate that the “remote” group includes
misrepresentations by defendants that are effectively countered by other information, either from
market makers who already know the correct information or from corrective information that
enters the market and dissipates the effect of the misstatement. The third is of a plaintiff who
knows the defendant’s statement is false but trades anyway because of an apparently unrelated
motive related to an antitrust problem. This last example illustrates what Goldberg and Zipursky
describe as a “volenti” concern.283 Virtually every tort deems certain actions by the plaintiffs
sufficient to limit or foreclose a claim, including consent and unjustified reliance. These tort
limitations are usually posed as affirmative defenses, and in securities fraud, allow for situations
in which, even if there is a price distortion and the market is efficient, the claim can be
foreclosed. That type of plaintiff is a “willing” market participant, and, therefore, not entitled to a
remedy.284
Importantly, however, the space covered by these three illustrations has shrunk
noticeably in the time since Basic –given the precise attention that Congress and the Court have
paid to possible overcompensation. More specifically, the first two examples today would likely
be addressed by a court under a truth-on-the-market analysis, a materiality question, which, after
Amgen, we know is not appropriate at class certification.285

Zipursky and Goldberg also note that Basic does more than create the presumption. The Court’s
theory also allows plaintiffs to use circumstantial evidence to support their argument that the defendant’s
misstatement distorted the market price. It works like this: if the issuer’s securities are traded in an
efficient market and a material misstatement is made to the public, it can be presumed that the
misrepresentation caused a price distortion. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29.
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And the chances of Congress acting to “revisit the entire remedial approach in the fraud-on-themarket setting, enabling private litigation but making it more clearly a deterrence-based mechanism” are
non-existent in the foreseeable future. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 59.
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Reflecting the Latin term. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 1795.
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Basic presents this example in the context of an individual investor, but in the usual class action
setting it would be relevant for the class as a whole—defendant would have to show that individual issues
predominated over common issues on this question. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1987).
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See e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F 2d. 509 (7th Cir. 1989).
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Next, recall that in Amgen the Court also emphasized that the class action inquiry is a
narrow one. The purpose of the inquiry at certification is not to adjudicate the merits of the
claim, but to ensure that the requisites of FCRP 23(b)(3) are met, with the focus largely on
whether questions common to the class predominate. The purpose is to determine whether a class
action is the appropriate method for resolving the claim. Defendants, of course, are motivated to
push forward to class certification any issue on which they can gain traction. Amgen, however,
makes clear that courts should resist efforts to move what are truly issues for trial, or the back
end of these cases, to class certification, or the front end of these cases. The failure of courts to
do so will defeat the role and power of certification, create mini-trials and merit creep, and
eliminate the enforcement aspect of the litigation.
Halliburton I and Amgen illustrate an additional principle that is important to
understanding the price impact evidence as tied to market efficiency. In Halliburton I, the Court
rejected the defendants’ attempt to require proof of loss causation, a Time 2 issue, and proof of
materiality, a Time 1 issue, at class certification. In doing so, the Court specifically said that
proof and these issues were appropriately left to trial. Yet, the Halliburton defendants have now
attempted to take the evidence they amassed on Time 2/loss causation and deploy it to disprove
market efficiency at Time 1. If sustained, this argument will eliminate the line drawn in
Halliburton I and allow market efficiency fights to be consumed with proof on loss causation
and debates about materiality. As a result, although defendants now have the opportunity to rebut
the market efficiency presumption at class certification, the space for doing so is, in fact, quite
small. Indeed, courts must keep in mind that: 1) the defendants bear the burden of proof; 2) the
inquiry is narrow; and 3) the elements of loss causation and materiality cannot be conflated with
market efficiency either in fact or in proof. The failure to do so will result in a situation in which
the procedure is allowed to swallow the substance.286
Finally, the third Basic rebuttal issue, the volenti context, presents an interesting case.
Note that the example in Basic (and also the one that Justices Brennan and Blackmun debated in
their exchange prior to the decision) related to an individual investor. In the typical class context
of 10b-5 litigation, the focus would be on whether such a motivation accrued to the class, or
perhaps to enough members of the class that a credible argument could be made that individual
issues would predominate over collective ones. A single individual with such a motivation
286

Early class certification opinions following Halliburton II are beginning to develop some limitations.
For example, a Florida trial court ruled that a truth-on-the market defense, which goes to materiality, may
not be used at the class certification stage to prove an absence of price impact and show a lack of
predominance. See Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (lack of
price impact treated as materiality that would defeat the arguments of the entire class and is better left for
trial stage). See also Local 703, Int’l Bhd. of T., Grocery & Food Emps Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin.
Corp., No. CV-10-J-2847-S, 2014 WL 6661918 at *1, *9 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014); Ganino v. Citizens
United, 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A] misrepresentation is immaterial if the information is
already known to the market because the misrepresentation cannot then defraud the market”); Fisch,
supra note 13, at 928 (“price distortion is closely related to materiality”).
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should not, in the market-as-intermediary world, block a class lest the mechanism and
enforcement power be defeated.287
2.

Market Intermediation and Price Impact

The next step is to take what we know about the market as intermediary and reliance and
apply it to price impact. The Halliburton I Court described price impact as “the effect of a
misrepresentation on a stock price.”288 Questions about burden of proof and others issues should
be resolved by reference to the learning about market intermediation in securities class actions as
reaffirmed in Halliburton II and the other Supreme Court cases discussed in this article. Lower
courts have begun to do exactly that.289 Courts should beware of conflating price impact with
price movement; otherwise, the lack of price movement will result in a finding of lack of price
impact, particularly if the price movement analysis focuses only on the time of the initial
fraud.290 Such an approach is over-inclusive. There are several circumstances in which a price
might be impacted by a misstatement and not change or not change much, if measured at the
time of the fraud. Consider the following seven situations, only two of which would
appropriately be addressed in the price impact space defined by Halliburton II.
1. Misstatement, but allegation that there is not an efficient market (for
example not enough analysts following a stock or enough liquidity to
generate sufficient information for efficient trading). This situation is
specifically covered by footnote 27 of Basic and would seem appropriate
for resolution at class certification.
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The separate question as to whether the individual plaintiff can be the class representative has been
carved away by Amgen and Halliburton II. See supra Part III, B.
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Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011).
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The holding of the Halliburton trial court on remand after Halliburton II seems consistent with this
narrow space for the rebuttal of the presumption, but still leaves room for additional litigation based on
dueling event studies. The trial court measured the absence of price impact at the time of the correction,
not the time of the misrepresentation, and it placed the burden of proof on the defendant to prove the lack
of price impact. It then certified the class as to one of the asbestos misrepresentations when the
company’s price had dropped 40%, but found the defendants had rebutted the presumption on five other
dates. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2015 WL 4522863, at *1
(N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015) (relying in substantial part on Fox, supra note 62). See also the cases in note
286 supra.
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The Halliburton defendants argued for visible and statistically significant price movement both when
they were asserting that plaintiffs must prove price impact and later in seeking to rebut the presumption.
See Defendants’ Brief on Price Impact, Demonstrating that Class Certification Must Be Denied at 2, Erica
P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 2015 WL 4522863 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 3:02-CV-1152-M) (“If
the ‘stock price did not increase’ following the alleged misrepresentation that is evidence of no price
impact”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (No. 09-1403), 2011 WL
1541295 (“All they had to do was show one day during that class period statistically significant price
movement, and they’re in.”).

50

MARKET INTERMEDIATION, PUBLICNESS, AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

2. Misstatement, but allegation that there was no publicity of the
misstatement—even where there is an efficient market for the stock. This
is specially covered by footnote 27 of Basic and would seem appropriate
for resolution at class certification.
3. Misstatement, but allegation that it was not material. This is also listed in
footnote 27 of Basic, but given the holding of Amgen, would not be
appropriate for resolution at class certification.
4. Misstatement, but defendant is not able to prove statistically significant
price impact so as to satisfy event study methodology regularly used in
modern securities class actions.291 Given the holding of Halliburton II, this
context would not be appropriate for resolution at class certification.
5. Misstatement, but the only price impact is attributable to an alternative or
intervening cause. Given the holding of Halliburton I, this would not be
appropriate for resolution at class certification.
6. Misstatement, but the defendant contests it. This would be resolved at
motion to dismiss, and, if not, at trial per Amgen.
7. Misstatement, but in context of price maintenance, i.e. allegation the
misstatement sought to prop up price in the face of new information that
would have led to decline. This is not raised in footnote 27, nor
Halliburton II, but the recent Supreme Court cases evidence this fact
pattern, and lower courts have upheld 10b-5 claims in price maintenance
cases without price movement at Time 1.
This series of fact patterns illustrates two outcomes as to price impact. First, the effect of
the misrepresentation may sometimes occur even though the price itself does not move at the
time of the misrepresentation. The result is that rebuttal of the presumption would not be
appropriate. Second, class certification cannot, and should not, resolve all issues in which there is
no effect of the misrepresentation on price.
The Halliburton facts illustrate the former, which is example 7, even though the Court itself did
not address the issue. In Halliburton, the plaintiffs’ initial allegations fell into three categories:
asbestos litigation liability, construction contract revenues, and merger cost savings. With respect
to all of the statements, the plaintiffs’ claim, whether understating liability or overstating
revenues and cost savings, is that the defendants made the misstatements in order to prevent the
market price from dropping. For example, the allegation with respect to the asbestos litigation is
291

See Fox, supra note 62 (discussing two measures that might be used by courts to determine if the
presumption has been rebutted: the first would leave defendants about where they were before
Halliburton II, and the second would advance the essential issue of loss causation to the class certification
point of litigation.
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that if the issuer had been truthful about the extent of its liability, which turned out to be much
higher than publicly stated at Time 1, the stock price would have dropped. The same is true
about the revenue-recognition allegation on the construction contracts, where the plaintiffs claim
that the defendants overstated the revenue and later had to correct it, as well as with respect to
the announced cost savings from the merger that were unrealistic. These arguments all depend on
information impoundment and market intermediation, but in the price maintenance context.292
Notice that the structure we have developed so far leaves us with the problem that
misrepresentations, scienter, materiality, and market efficiency are tied to Time 1, but fraud
visibility and damages generally occur at Time 2. Thus, the liability, construction, and merger
misrepresentations all occur at Time 1 points, but because the purpose of these announcements
is, through market intermediation, to prevent the price of the company’s stock from falling, it is
possible for them to both distort the price of the stock (or have a price impact) with little or no
movement in the stock price.
This pattern is the essence of price maintenance, and the argument, price impact without
price movement, is common, was also made in Dura and Amgen, and is not susceptible of Time
1, price-movement proof. Additionally, price maintenance situations reveal that it is possible to
have an efficient market that shows little or no movement at Time 1, because the distortion
occurred through price stabilization. In short, price distortions can exist without price movement.
As a result, courts must review motions for class certification and fights about price impact both
with an understanding of the types of situations that can occur, the narrowness of the allowed
inquiry, and the maintenance issue in mind. 293
Amgen, Halliburton II and illustration number 4 above also reveal another possibility:
there are cases where the price does not move, but the issue should not be resolved at class
certification because it does not go to the core class question of whether individual issues
predominate. The majority opinion in Halliburton II acknowledges via an example that there
remains something of a failsafe where the connection of a class of plaintiffs is so insufficiently
tied to the alleged fraud that the remnants of reliance might be used to end even an open market
292

The same is arguably true of Dura and Amgen. The Dura plaintiffs argued that the defendants
repeatedly made statements about expected sales and profits as well as impending drug approval, despite
knowing that the neither the profits nor the drug approval were likely, including statements about the
continued development of the drugs and progress of drug trials. See Plaintiff’s Fourth Consolidated
Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. 99-CV-0151-L(WMC), 2006 WL 3267513 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2006).; In Amgen, the plaintiffs
argued that the defendants continued to make statements about the safety of certain drugs despite growing
evidence to the contrary. See Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., No. CV 07-2536 PSG,
2009 WL 2633743, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009).
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Many courts have recognized the effect of maintenance, even if the Supreme Court has not yet done
so. See, e.g. McIntire v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); IBEW
Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. August 6, 2014); In re Pfizer
Inc. Sec. Litig., 936 F Supp.2d 252, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); FindWhat Investors Grp. v. FindWhat.com,
658 F.3d 1282, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (fraudulent misstatements that prolong inflation can be just as
harmful).
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fraud case (as opposed to scienter or misrepresentation issues resolved on motion to dismiss or
loss causation and materiality resolved at other points in litigation).294 This example seemingly
intrudes at least partly on the space occupied by materiality, but the overlap does not seem to be
large. Justice Ginsburg, author of the court’s Amgen materiality opinion just the term before,
concurs in the Halliburton II majority briefly noting it “should impose no heavy toll on
securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.”295 The two opinions illustrate our argument that
the space available to contest efficiency is, in fact, quite small and is supported both by the
publicness goals of securities regulation and by the front-end uses of market efficiency to justify
deregulation.
In short, reliance and the efficient market presumption as well as the narrowness of the
rebuttal space for price impact, are supported by a more general understanding of market
intermediation and the role it plays in supporting issuers’ access to the capital markets. A key
prerequisite for the presumption of reliance is the existence of an efficient market. In
Halliburton, the defendants argued that a lack of price movement revealed that the market was
not efficient and thus the presumption was rebutted. Of course, this argument fails to account for
price maintenance.
Moreover, if we step back from the econometric studies and consider Halliburton’s place in the
securities market, it raises the question of whether it passes the straight-face test for a Fortune
500, New York Stock Exchange traded company to claim that the market for its stock lacks
efficiency. Indeed, it is arguably disingenuous for companies, like Halliburton, who are Form S3 filers to take the front-end, registration-side advantages of market intermediation but deny the
enforcement-side of it on the back end.296
This is the point at which our construct of the regulatory goals as being motivated by
publicness, along with market intermediation, provides traction. The answer to the specific
application of Halliburton II, as well as the larger role of the class action more generally, lies in
our acceptance of the need for strong securities markets. Class actions, as we have argued, are
important for policing and protecting the market and ensuring belief in its strength. This is their
enforcement and deterrence role, and that role, in turn, contributes to the belief in the market that
attracts capital and creates stability. The market, of course, works to allocate capital from
investors to users, and issuers rely on the market, its intermediation and efficiency, to access that
capital. Capital allocation, in turn, supports growth and innovation. Market intermediation also
plays a role in access to capital and offerings, and in deterrence, by providing the necessary
reliance bridge for predominance, a requirement for a securities class action. These reasons, in
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Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2415-16 (2014).
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See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014)
(Ginsburg J. concurring). The two views on the causal link that reliance requires may be no further apart
than the views of Justices Brennan and Blackmun on the same point in their exchange of memoranda in
Basic discussed above at note 158.
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See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989) (the court implicitly recognized this
argument when it included S-3 filings as one measure of market efficiency).
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combination with the case law, support our conclusion that although market efficiency inquiries
are allowed at the class certification stage of the procedure, the inquiry is to be a narrow one that
does not conflate loss causation or materiality with market efficiency and is mindful of price
maintenance. Insisting on these limitations will help to avoid merit creep and mini trials. It will
also help to ensure that the market protection essential to innovation and growth.
CONCLUSION
This Article develops the role that market intermediation plays in securities regulation –
both on the front and back end. On the back end, its role reflects both concerns about the
possibility of overcompensation and the place that enforcement plays in ensuring belief in strong
securities markets.297 The front-end regulatory examples reveal how market intermediation
facilitates capital formation and deregulation.298 Here, for example, it replaces other options,
including a merits-based regulatory system. On the back end, through litigation and deterrence,
market intermediation resolves collective action problems through the class action. In short, the
market efficiency theory has withstood the test of time for the same reasons that industry has
deployed it on the front end, because it is “a reasonable approximation of the truth” that both
enables rulemaking and capital raising, as well as class-action policing of open-market fraud.299
In sum, the securities fraud class action has evolved and endured because of the role it
plays in enforcement and the publicness of the markets. It does so through, at least in part,
market intermediation. As we explored, the market plays a part as an intermediary and enables
securities regulation on the front end and, through deterrence/enforcement, on the back end.
Thus, efficiency and intermediation on the front end correlates with efficiency and
intermediation on the back end. In today’s world, open-market cases are different from their
common law counterparts, and the Basic presumption recognizes that difference. It allows these
cases to proceed and to fulfill their enforcement role. Further, the class action as modified by the
Courts and Congress balances concerns about overcompensation with those about unchecked
fraud and, in doing so, makes its own contribution to market efficiency. Congress chose the
elements that should be addressed at the motion to dismiss and those that belong to the merits
stage, resulting in a very stringent inquiry that itself verges on a dispute about the merits. Class
certification is not designed to be, and should not be, the same. It should not become the driver,
because if it does, procedure, and the Court’s increased willingness to indulge in it, will continue
to result in added costs and layers of litigation with very little pay off to the litigants, the
markets, or the public. Although this means that some cases that survive and settle will have
merit and some will not, that is, in fact, the way the litigation system works. Indeed, viewed in
that light, market intermediation, publicness, and the securities class action combine to yield the
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It is also the product of cost benefit analysis. See Langevoort, supra note 51; Lynn A. Stout, Type I
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type of second-best theoretical solution that is the nature of the regulatory enterprise and
litigation more generally.
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